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The Clash Between China and the United States and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region – A Security Dilemma, a Balance of Power, and the Bandwagon Effect

Introduction

It seems that the Europocentric view of security research and international relations has made it relatively recent that a significant increase of the overall power of the People's Republic of China has begun to become widely accepted. It seems that for the Western world, the dispute over the East and the South China Sea or the rapidly progressing modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) have until recently remained in the shadow of the widely understood "war on terror", the refugee crisis in Europe, or the subsequent manifestations of the neo-imperialist policy of the Russian Federation. Without a doubt, the most spectacular was the Chinese economy's success. Within only a few decades, the country became second (using weighted purchasing power parity when calculating Gross Domestic Product indicator, even first) world economy³, the biggest exporter⁴, and a key source of Foreign Direct

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³ The World Bank, *World Development Indicators*, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&country=&series=NY.GDP.MKTP.CD&period=#>.

⁴ M. Adamczyk, *Nowy Jedwabny Szlak jako próba stworzenia mocarstwa lądowego w myśl klasycznych teorii geopolitycznych*, "Kultura – Historia – Globalizacja" 2017, No. 22, p. 11.

Investment (FDI)⁵. Simultaneously, it is clearer to see Beijing's growing ambition to play an even greater role globally – both economically and politically⁶. The evolution that has taken place in Chinese politics is strongly linked to Xi Jinping's chairmanship in 2012⁷. So far, many indicators point that a culmination of the new Chinese “engagement policy” will be a New Silk Road (NSR) project. At the same time, Beijing's goal is to create alternative, parallel institutions of multilateral development in opposition to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) – which the West still dominates⁸. The institutions in mind are the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank BRICS (NDB)⁹. It should be emphasized that the Middle Kingdom, under new leadership, conducts decisive economic policy and presents the following political projects to the world. It also drives a more assertive security policy (for example, on the disputed islands in the East China Sea and the South China Sea). Beijing invests in developing new maritime and air fleets to close the gap to other countries and expand their operational capacity far beyond their coastal waters. The need to have the ability to operate in open waters and protect the sea lanes of communication is even mentioned in “White Paper” 2014¹⁰. It is an indispensable condition in building up one's position as a local power and a country that matters at the world's level.

⁵ M. Adamczyk, *Globalizacja rodem z Chin – nowa jakość w światowej polityce czy utarte schematy?*, [in:] *Szkice z polityki bezpieczeństwa i myśli politycznej*, eds. M. Soboń, M. Habowski, G. Tokarz, Poznań 2017, p. 126; The American Enterprise Institute; The Heritage Foundation, *China Global Investment Tracker*, <http://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/> [access: 16.07.2019].

⁶ M. Adamczyk, *Globalizacja rodem z Chin...*, op.cit., p. 131; J. Chin, *China Says Prepared to Lead Global Economy if Necessary*, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-says-prepared-to-lead-global-economy-if-necessary-1485178890> [access: 16.07.2019]; B. Blanchard, *Diplomat says China would assume world leadership if needed*, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa-politics-idUSKBN1570ZZ> [access: 15.07.2019].

⁷ M. Kaczmarski, *Jedwabna globalizacja. Chińska wizja ładu międzynarodowego*, “Punkt Widzenia OSW” 2016, No. 60, p. 5.

⁸ M. Adamczyk, *Globalizacja rodem z Chin...*, op.cit., p. 131; see more: A. Malkin, B. Momani, *Emerging Powers and IMF Reform: Where Multipolarity in the World Economy is Leading the Fund*, “St Antony's International Review” 2017, No. 1 (7), pp. 61–78; I. Czerny, *Wchodzi w życie reforma MFW wzmacniająca rolę gospodarek wschodzących*, <https://www.bankier.pl/wiadomosc/Wchodzi-w-zycie-reforma-MFW-wzmacniajaca-role-gospodarek-wschodzacych-3476812.html>.

⁹ M. Adamczyk, *Globalizacja rodem z Chin...*, op.cit., p. 126; G. Yin, *The BRICS Bank and China's Economic Statecraft*, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/the-brics-bank-and-chinas-economic-statecraft/>; S. Tiezzi, *Don't Forget About the New BRICS Bank*, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/dont-forget-about-the-new-brics-bank/>.

¹⁰ M. Adamczyk, *Wyznaczniki ewolucji chińskiej polityki zagranicznej zawarte w Białej Księdze Obrony 2014*, “Zeszyty Naukowe Towarzystwa Doktorantów UJ. Nauki Społeczne” 2017, Vol. 18, pp. 93–94; The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Data-base/WhitePapers/> [access: 19.07.2019].

According to most prognoses, the Asia-Pacific region will play a crucial role within the next few decades. Therefore, a confrontation between the US and China seems to be inevitable. Is the trade war only the beginning of the clash between the current hegemon and the contender? Maybe, especially since, after several years of ignoring the dynamic growth of the Chinese power, today we are dealing with almost warlike rhetoric in which China figures as a significant threat to world peace and prosperity¹¹. As a result, more and more, we hear about the growing Chinese threat – the media report on Chinese spies, cyber-attacks, and incidents at sea all the time. Finally, the United States started a so-called trade war with China and imposed sanctions on Chinese corporations. Is this change in discourse reasonably justified? Is China suddenly a threat to the Asia-Pacific region's security, and perhaps also to the rest of the world? Has China achieved such a significant increase in its security level (or power) in the last few decades that we can say that there arises a dilemma or even a security paradox in the region? If so, have the most important countries in the region taken action to prevent a reduction of their level of security? Have these countries finally begun to balance China? Or maybe some of them, taking advantage of the opportunity offered by the emergence of a revisionist state, decided to bandwagon? Or perhaps the Chinese threat to Asia's stability and the Pacific exists only in the declarative sphere, and no real action is taking place? To answer the research questions, the following theses were formulated: a) China has provoked a security dilemma among Asian and Pacific countries to arise; b) Some countries in the region under US leadership are seeking to balance China, while others (a growing number of them) are willing to bandwagon to Beijing. For confirmation or rejection of this thesis, the authors used a content analysis and comparative method.

The end of the Cold War in 1989 and the demise of the world's bipolar division of power is a perfect starting point for the investigation, while 2018 will mark the end in the study's time-frame. The first chapter briefly describes a realistic approach to international relations and security studies. It explains the use of the concepts of balance of power, security dilemma, and bandwagoning. The second chapter presents data on China's defense expenditure, the USA, Russia, Japan, India, Pakistan, and Australia – in the authors' opinion, the most important actors in the region. In the third chapter, which is a substitute for the summary, the authors analyze the situation in the Asia-Pacific region using the previously presented theoretical approach and empirical data. This article's

¹¹ A. Grzywacz, *Closer to a threat than an opportunity: Polish perception of China's rise and international engagement*, "Asia Europe Journal" 2019, No. 18, pp. 177–194.

data come from Polish and English specialist websites, leading think-tanks and information portals, magazines, specialist literature, and Polish and foreign scientific papers (including previously published results of own research). This work attempts to widen the authors' earlier research in that field¹² by updating and supplementing the information. Undoubtedly, the last few years were a time of dynamic changes in the region. Hence, in the authors' opinion, it raises a need to widen and update the research.

Theoretical Background

Although internally quite diverse, the realistic paradigm is generally based on the conviction of states' leading role in international relations¹³. Although realists see international organizations' existence, they are usually critical of them – they perceive them as tools in the hands of states, emanating only from their will and making “false promises” that states will act differently in their forum than outside them¹⁴. The classic realist Hans Morgenthau, referring to the League of Nations' example, even stated that its creation is a classic example of an error in thinking. It consists of searching for the so-called “single cause” and at the same time a simple remedy for complex problems¹⁵. The assumption is inextricably linked with another one, according to which states are single actors – although there are internal discussions about the foreign policy's shape¹⁶. Yet the decisions made are implemented in the name of national interest defined in terms of strength/power¹⁷. The states are also competitive

¹² M. Adamczyk, P. Rutkowska, *China and Asia-Pacific region in China's Military Strategy*, “Torun International Studies” 2017, No. 1 (10), pp. 83–99; M. Adamczyk, *Porównanie zmiany potencjału militarnego Chin na tle Rosji, Indii, Stanów Zjednoczonych oraz Japonii w okresie od 1989 do 2013 roku*, [in:] *Aspekty bezpieczeństwa w życiu publicznym*, eds. D. Magierek, M. Pogonowski, Koszalin 2015, pp. 123–140.

¹³ K. Jaworski, *Teoretyczne aspekty analizy polityki zagranicznej państwa*, “Myśl Ekonomiczna i Polityczna” 2010, No. 3 (30), pp. 156–157; T. Łoś-Nowak, *Stosunki międzynarodowe. Teorie – systemy – uczestnicy*, Wrocław 2010, p. 44.

¹⁴ A. Dudek, *Użyteczność analitycznego eklektyzmu w badaniu stosunków Polski z Rosją*, “Stosunki Międzynarodowe – International Relations” 2016, No. 2 (52), p. 41.

¹⁵ H.J. Morgenthau, *Polityka między narodami. Walka o potęgę i pokój*, Warszawa 2010, p. 62.

¹⁶ M. Kaczmarek, *Realizm neoklasycyzy, [in:] Teorie i podejścia w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych*, eds. R. Zięba, S. Bieleń, J. Zajac, Warszawa 2015, p. 16; K. Mingst, *Podstawy stosunków międzynarodowych*, Warszawa 2006, p. 68. It is worth remembering that, until recently, there was a consensus on the homogeneity of the state within realism (the famous metaphors of “black boxes” or “billiard balls”), but a growing number of researchers connected with neoclassical realism began to emphasize the influence of internal factors on the shape of the state's foreign policy, and thus to approach the assumption of its homogeneity less restrictively – which, incidentally, became one of the accusations against neoclassical realists as those who depart from (neoclassical) realistic orthodoxy.

¹⁷ J. Snyder, *One World, Rival Theories*, “Foreign Policy” 2009, No. 145, pp. 52–62; J. Czuputowicz,

and generally rarely willing to cooperate – like a lonely hunter who prefers to hunt down smaller trophies on his own than to cooperate with others to achieve better results (“self-help” principle). It is because, in realistic optics, profits are relative, i.e. dependent on the profits and losses of other countries – just like the level of power itself¹⁸. For Hans Morgenthau, power meant both quantifiable factors (geographical conditions, economic and military potential) and non-quantifiable factors (national characteristics, leadership, quality of the state apparatus). Morgenthau interestingly described power as a “psychological relationship between those who execute it and those who submit to it”¹⁹. Kenneth Waltz also distinguished similar state power components: the human factor, natural resources, economic strength and military potential, and stability and quality of power. In contrast to his realistic ancestors, the contemporary offensive neo-realist John Mearsheimer sees power very narrowly as the sum of population potential and national wealth²⁰. In the context of power, the realists of most trends agree on one thing: in principle, *hard power* is more important than *soft power*²¹.

Researchers associated with the realistic paradigm define power in different ways and perceive differently the reasons for which states strive to accumulate it. For the classic realists, this reason is a man who, by his very nature, is evil and egoistic and oriented towards having as much power as possible²². The neo-realists see these reasons in the anarchic (decentralized) structure of the international system – uncertainty and lack of world government determine competition. In a way, the system rewards good decisions and punishes for mistakes²³. Neoclassical realists see the reasons for seeking power both in the international system structure and internal relations (e.g. fights of interest

Mapa współczesnego realizmu: realizm klasyczny, neorealizm, realizm neoklasyczny, [in:] *Teoria realizmu w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych. Założenia i zastosowania badawcze*, eds. E. Haliżak, J. Czaputowicz, Warszawa 2014, pp. 26–41.

¹⁸ A. Wojciuk, *Dylemat potęgi. Praktyczna teoria stosunków międzynarodowych*, Warszawa 2010, p. 24.

¹⁹ H.J. Morgenthau, *op.cit.*, p. 48.

²⁰ J. Czaputowicz, *Teorie stosunków międzynarodowych. Krytyka i systematyzacja*, Warszawa 2008, pp. 36–37; J. Czaputowicz, *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Współczesne koncepcje*, Warszawa 2012, pp. 106–107.

²¹ M. Kaczmarski, *Realizm neoklasyczny...*, *op.cit.*, p. 16.

²² K. Mingst, *Podstawy stosunków międzynarodowych*, Warszawa 2006, p. 70; A. Tomczyńska, *Realizm ofensywny Johna J. Mearsheimera a hegemonia Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki po zimnej wojnie*, [in:] *Teoria realizmu w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych. Założenia i zastosowania badawcze*, eds. E. Haliżak, J. Czaputowicz, Warszawa 2014, pp. 341–356.

²³ M. Kozub-Karkut, *Realizm neoklasyczny – główne założenia i możliwości*, [in:] *Teoria realizmu w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych. Założenia i zastosowania badawcze*, eds. E. Haliżak, J. Czaputowicz, p. 43; M. Kaczmarski, *Realizm neoklasyczny...*, *op.cit.*, p. 15.

groups)²⁴. It is worth recalling at this point that against the background of the dispute over the extent to which states should seek power, another dividing line within the framework of structural realism has emerged. Some researchers opted for a position saying that states should always use the opportunity to gain further power resources – this trend has been called offensive realism over time. They argued that the international system forces states to maximize power because the more power there is, the greater the security level. The best guarantee of security is to have more power than others. Another group was made up of researchers who believed that once a certain security power level had been reached, the state should stop making further efforts to increase it. In their view, excess power can be as dangerous as a shortage. According to defensive realists, other states will seek to form a coalition to balance the threat in such a situation²⁵. Only when the state reaches the absolute security threshold will some of the allies change sides – in line with the strategy of joining a stronger party (“bandwagoning”). It will probably be done by states dissatisfied with the *status quo* and seeing this as an opportunity to improve their position²⁶. From the point of view of offensive realism, it is best protected against the emergence of revisionist states by its imperialism – although states may wish to be defensive, the international system’s structure forces them to adopt the worst-case scenario and seek security through domination²⁷.

Simultaneously, the offensive realist John Mearsheimer questions the possibility of a global hegemony without denying the existence of regional hegemony²⁸. It is worth remembering that although hegemony seems to be inseparably connected with a realistic postulate of maximizing power, the representatives of this trend are reluctant to do so. They prefer a bipolar and multipolar system to ensure equal distribution of *power* in the system and thus more stable and predictable²⁹. According to most realists, the states are afraid of emerging a hegemon that could dominate them. Therefore, they undermine the very

²⁴ J. Czaputowicz, *Mapa współczesnego realizmu: realizm klasyczny...*, op.cit., p. 34; M. Kozub-Karkut, op.cit., p. 50.

²⁵ J. Czaputowicz, *Teorie stosunków międzynarodowych. Krytyka i systematyzacja...*, op.cit., pp. 192–193; J. Czaputowicz, *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Współczesne koncepcje...*, op.cit., pp. 108–109; J. Snyder, op.cit., p. 56.

²⁶ M. Kaczmarski, *Realizm neoklasyczny...*, op.cit., p. 21.

²⁷ J.J. Mearsheimer, *The tragedy of great power politics*, New York–London 2001, p. 2.

²⁸ P. Majewski, *System hegemoniczny w ujęciu realizmu strukturalnego*, “Historia i Polityka” 2018, No. 25 (32), p. 120; J.J. Mearsheimer, op.cit., p. 2; A. Tomczyńska, op.cit., p. 342.

²⁹ J. Czaputowicz, *Teorie stosunków międzynarodowych. Krytyka i systematyzacja...*, op.cit., pp. 185–186; J. Czaputowicz, *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Współczesne koncepcje...*, op.cit., p. 108.

existence of the sovereign states' system – a panacea in this situation can only be the balance of power, a natural mechanism for an international system with an anarchic structure³⁰.

It should be noted that a completely different point of view on the existence of global hegemony was presented in the 1980s by the post-classical realist Robert Gilpin³¹. He was also less skeptical about the possibility of cooperation between states – in contrast to neo-realists, he believed that they did not follow a zero-one logic (which enforces the inevitability of conflict) but considered the chance of conflict. The lower the probability of conflict occurrence, the more likely cooperation between states is. Therefore, we can assume that states without conflicting interests will be willing to cooperate even if one seeks to increase its level of power³². Theoretically, it should lead to a security dilemma or persuade other states to balance their opponents (to achieve the balance of power).

The security dilemma is a theoretical concept that describes a process in the international system in which one state increases its power to increase its security level. The increase in one state's power causes the remaining states to face a dilemma about how to interpret this situation (the dilemma of interpretation) – are they dealing with offensive or defensive armaments³³? Choosing one of the options, they face a dilemma how to act in the face of a given interpretation (the dilemma of response) – do nothing or, on the contrary, increase their military capabilities? The latter may lead to the creation of the same dilemma in other countries, and as a result, may provoke a situation in which the so-called security paradox will occur. It is a self-propelling mechanism of growing hostility and fear in the international system, which emanation is most often known from the history of an arms race. It leads to a decrease in the system's security level – although the primary cause of the paradox was something completely different because the desire to increase

³⁰ J. Czaputowicz, *Teorie stosunków międzynarodowych. Krytyka i systematyzacja...*, op.cit., p. 39; J. Czaputowicz, *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Współczesne koncepcje...*, op.cit., p. 108.

³¹ J. Czaputowicz, *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Współczesne koncepcje...*, op.cit., p. 29; R. Gilpin, *War and change in world politics*, Cambridge 1981, p. 29; W.C. Wohlforth, *Gilpinian Realism and International Relations*, "International Relations" 2011, No. 4 (25), p. 502.

³² Gilpin's views are interestingly connected with Alexander Wendt's constructivist view, who pointed out that states have a different view of the rise in power among enemies and friends.

³³ In this context, it could be an increase in defence spending, but also a modernisation and reform of the armed forces or, finally, an improvement in the level of training resulting from, for example, more frequent exercises.

the level of one's own security by one of the countries. It is because practically every weapon (even a purely defensive one) can increase the state's potential to carry out aggression. To illustrate: a larger shield allows for being shielded from an opponent's hit (defensive function), but also for striking with a sword or spear (offensive function) with impunity. As a result, states acting according to the principle of "worst-case scenario" just in case assume that other states are preparing themselves for aggression, while in their opinion, they only defend themselves³⁴.

As opposed to the security paradox, the balance of power stems not from misperception but from the international system's anarchic structure – to counteract the change in the *status quo*, states will strive to preserve it. To this end, they can balance internally (by increasing their military capabilities) and externally (by forming or joining a coalition). On the other hand, some states may choose to join an aggressive/revisionist state instead of striving to maintain/restore the balance of power – a phenomenon called bandwagoning in international relations. This choice will usually be dictated by the desire to share in potential profits – states dissatisfied with the current power distribution in the system may look for a chance to connect to the system to change it favorably. Balancing and bandwagoning in a competitive international system are de facto two sides of the same coin – countries choose one or the other strategy depending on whether they currently want to maintain the *status quo* or change their unsatisfactory power distribution in the system.

On the other hand, it is not easy to expect that Poland will start to join Russia to balance the United States in the foreseeable time horizon. Although a few years ago there were concepts of common balancing of the latter two countries with China's revisionist attitude, nowadays there is hardly any indication that such a variant would come true. Nowadays, more and more attention is being paid to other (internal) factors determining the choice of a given strategy than just the power distribution in the system and the desire to change or maintain the *status quo*³⁵. Referring to the assumptions of Robert Gilpin's post-classical realism, for these considerations, we will assume that states will be more inclined to balance those among them which they perceive as a threat and to join those in relations with which the risk of conflict is low.

³⁴ J. Czaputowicz, *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Współczesne koncepcje...*, op.cit., pp. 109–112; K. Mingst, op.cit., p. 206.

³⁵ J. Czaputowicz, *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Współczesne koncepcje...*, op.cit., pp. 108–109; K. Mingst, op.cit., p. 32; J. Zając, *Bandwagoning w polskiej polityce zagranicznej*, "Przegląd Zachodni" 2009, No. 3 (330), p. 168.

Military Expenditure in China, United States, Japan, Russia, India, Pakistan, and Australia: Comparative Analysis

This chapter deals with the military expenditure of the seven countries in question. Following is Table 1. depicting the defense spending data as a percentage of GDP given in relative numbers. Table 2. details the specific sums in absolute numbers that were spent on defense. All the outlays are displayed in mln USD at the current dollar value of the year in question, which will allow us to draw an accurate and reliable comparison. The chapter ends with an analysis of the dataset. It may also be helpful as a starting point for a potential discussion and further studies.

Table 1. Military expenditure data as a share of GDP: China, United States, Japan, Russian, India, Pakistan, and Australia

Country \ Year	China	USA	Japan	Russia	India	Pakistan	Australia
1989	2,5%	5,5%	0,9%	N/A	3,5%	6,5%	2,1%
1990	2,5%	5,3%	0,9%	N/A	3,1%	6,5%	2,1%
1991	2,3%	4,6%	0,9%	N/A	2,9%	6,6%	2,2%
1992	2,5%	4,7%	0,9%	4,4%	2,7%	6,7%	2,2%
1993	2,0%	4,3%	1,0%	4,2%	2,8%	6,4%	2,2%
1994	1,7%	3,9%	0,9%	4,5%	2,7%	5,9%	2,1%
1995	1,7%	3,6%	0,9%	3,8%	2,6%	5,8%	2,0%
1996	1,7%	3,4%	0,9%	3,8%	2,5%	6,0%	1,9%
1997	1,7%	3,2%	0,9%	4,0%	2,6%	5,6%	1,9%
1998	1,7%	3,0%	0,9%	2,7%	2,7%	5,4%	1,9%
1999	1,9%	2,9%	0,9%	3,1%	3,0%	5,2%	1,9%
2000	1,9%	2,9%	0,9%	3,3%	2,9%	4,2%	1,8%
2001	2,1%	2,9%	0,9%	3,5%	2,9%	3,9%	1,9%
2002	2,2%	3,2%	1,0%	3,8%	2,8%	4,1%	1,9%
2003	2,1%	3,6%	1,0%	3,7%	2,7%	4,1%	1,8%
2004	2,1%	3,8%	0,9%	3,3%	2,8%	4,0%	1,8%
2005	2,0%	3,9%	0,9%	3,3%	2,8%	3,9%	1,8%
2006	2,0%	3,8%	0,9%	3,2%	2,5%	3,6%	1,8%
2007	1,9%	3,9%	0,9%	3,1%	2,3%	3,5%	1,8%
2008	1,9%	4,2%	0,9%	3,1%	2,6%	3,5%	1,8%
2009	2,1%	4,6%	1,0%	3,9%	2,9%	3,3%	1,9%
2010	1,9%	4,7%	1,0%	3,6%	2,7%	3,4%	1,9%
2011	1,8%	4,6%	1,0%	3,4%	2,7%	3,3%	1,8%
2012	1,8%	4,2%	1,0%	3,7%	2,5%	3,5%	1,7%

2013	1,9%	3,8%	1,0%	3,8%	2,5%	3,5%	1,6%
2014	1,9%	3,5%	1,0%	4,1%	2,5%	3,5%	1,8%
2015	1,9%	3,3%	1,0%	4,9%	2,4%	3,6%	2,0%
2016	1,9%	3,3%	0,9%	5,5%	2,5%	3,6%	2,1%
2017	1,9%	3,1%	0,9%	4,2%	2,5%	3,8%	2,0%
2018	1,9%	3,2%	0,9%	3,9%	2,4%	4,0%	1,9%

Source: own elaboration with data from *SIPRI Military Expenditure Database* (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2019).

Table 2. Data for military expenditure by country in mln USD³⁶: China, United States, Japan, Russian, India, Pakistan, and Australia

Country Year	China	USA	Japan	Russia	India	Pakistan	Australia
1989	11 403,45	304 085,00	27 966,35	N/A	10 589,80	2 580,14	6 300,01
1990	10 085,08	306 170,00	28 800,45	N/A	10 537,04	2 810,10	6 704,21
1991	9 953,64	280 292,00	32 785,42	N/A	8 622,47	3 067,12	7 023,51
1992	12 420,30	305 141,00	35 999,12	N/A	8 083,23	3 388,78	6 882,09
1993	12 577,17	297 637,00	41 353,94	7 766,72	8 253,54	3 308,76	6 733,83
1994	10 050,59	288 059,00	45 285,59	13 547,87	8 880,55	3 320,62	7 459,70
1995	12 606,23	278 856,00	49 961,67	12 741,63	9 754,47	3 665,93	7 665,88
1996	14 563,24	271 417,00	44 047,11	15 826,34	9 904,67	3 547,80	8 202,78
1997	16 104,92	276 325,00	40 634,84	17 577,35	11 464,88	3 320,24	7 936,89
1998	17 527,99	274 278,00	37 849,01	7 955,73	11 920,61	3 218,88	7 107,54
1999	21 027,34	280 969,00	43 122,90	6 469,04	13 895,56	3 080,76	7 770,25
2000	22 929,76	301 697,00	45 509,67	9 228,20	14 287,51	2 973,07	7 273,76
2001	27 875,39	312 743,00	40 757,97	11 683,15	14 600,64	2 842,05	7 043,15
2002	32 137,74	356 720,00	39 333,71	13 943,83	14 749,67	3 273,40	7 946,77
2003	35 126,30	415 223,00	42 486,18	16 973,74	16 333,99	3 722,81	9 926,65
2004	40 352,71	464 676,00	45 339,81	20 955,41	20 238,57	4 128,20	11 995,22
2005	45 918,88	503 353,00	44 300,61	27 336,98	23 072,31	4 587,11	13 237,79
2006	55 337,49	527 660,00	41 552,59	34 517,78	23 951,93	4 969,20	14 239,78
2007	68 011,56	556 961,00	40 530,05	43 535,00	28 254,77	5 342,58	17 186,44
2008	86 362,10	621 131,00	46 361,47	56 183,79	33 002,38	5 226,68	18 633,09
2009	105 644,21	668 567,00	51 465,16	51 532,12	38 722,15	5 274,57	18 960,14
2010	115 711,78	698 180,00	54 655,45	58 720,23	46 090,45	5 974,61	23 217,69
2011	137 967,30	711 338,00	60 762,21	70 237,52	49 633,82	6 954,79	26 597,20
2012	157 390,38	684 780,00	60 011,53	81 469,40	47 216,92	7 478,97	26 216,58
2013	179 880,45	639 704,00	49 023,93	88 352,90	47 403,53	7 645,45	24 825,26
2014	200 772,20	609 914,00	46 881,24	84 696,51	50 914,11	8 654,93	25 783,71
2015	214 093,07	596 104,64	42 106,10	66 418,71	51 295,48	9 483,48	24 045,57

³⁶ At the current dollar value of the year in question.

2016	216 031,28	600 106,44	46 471,29	69 245,31	56 637,62	9 973,77	26 382,95
2017	227 829,42	605 802,93	45 387,03	66 527,30	64 559,44	11 461,25	27 691,11
2018	249 996,90	648 798,27	46 617,95	61 387,55	66 510,29	11 375,52	26 711,83

Source: own elaboration with data from *SIPRI Military Expenditure Database* (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2019).

The analysis of the presented body of data shows some interesting points, i.e. in the first decade since the end of the Cold War, military spending in the United States was at a falling trend both in terms of relative and absolute value. In the Russian Federation, this trend was much less noticeable, and military expenditures as a share of GDP remained higher than in the USA – until the beginning of the 21st century. Of course, in relative numbers, they were even several dozen times lower. It is worth remembering that Russia, which inherited the bulk of the armed forces after the decline of the USSR, entered then a period of a deep economic crisis that its mark on the Russian army's condition³⁷. The beginning of the new century, however, brought about a noticeable change in the situation. In 1999, after Vladimir Putin took the position as Prime Minister, and a year later, the Russian military spending returned to the rising trend, which has stopped just in 2014 (in relative value even two years later). Since those events, the Russian military spending was increased by more than 40% within the first year. Russia's defense expenditure exceeded the ceiling of 4,4% of GDP (level from 1992) in 2015. Overall growth in military spending in Russia since the USSR fall until 2018 was almost 700%. On the other hand, over the last decade, the growth was symbolic and around 10%.

In the US, the end of the Cold War brought a pervasive optimism based on the victory over the former Soviet Block and becoming the first superpower in the world. As far as the defense budget is concerned, the falling trend was reverted two years before WTC and Pentagon terrorist attacks in 2001. The military expenditure level of 1989 was exceeded in 2001, and it was doubled until 2008. Since then, it has usually remained at a level of more than 600 billion USD (except 2015). On the other hand, the defense spending to GDP ratio has been in a steady decline since 2010 (when it reached the level of 4,7% – last seen in 1992). The overall growth of military expenditure since 1989 was more than 110% (in the last decade, less than 5%).

In Japan, the military budget, customarily limited to roughly 1% of GDP, increased during the period considered (since 1989) by approximately 75% (and

³⁷ B. Potyrała, H. Szczegóła, *Armia rosyjska po upadku ZSRR (1992–2000)*, Zielona Góra 2000, pp. 5–199.

virtually nothing since 2008). It is worth noting that although in 1989 Japan was only behind the United States in terms of military spending, in 2018, it was far behind not only China but also significantly behind Russia and India. In India, military expenditure in 1989 was minimally lower than in China (also minimally higher than in Russia in 1992). It amounted only to 38% of Japan's outlays on its army, which gives less than 3,5% of the US military budget. India allotted no more than 3,0% of GDP to the army almost every year, which adds up to more than 500% growth in the period under consideration (military budget doubled in the last decade) and shows a constantly rising trend. At the end of the Cold War (2,5 bln USD), Pakistan's military budget was insignificant compared to the United States, Japan, or even China.

Interestingly, at that time, this country allocated the largest share of its GDP among the surveyed countries, as much as 6,5%. This situation persisted until the end of the 20th century, when expenditure in relative values began to decline, albeit slowly but steadily increasing in absolute numbers. The total increase in military spending between 1989 and 2018 was just over 340% (more than 115% in the last ten years). At the moment, however, they still amount to a small percentage of other surveyed countries. The most recent case under examination is Australia, which in 1989 was spending on defense more than half of the military expenditure in China and India and almost a quarter in Japan. Less than thirty years later, Australia's defense budget is 325% bigger (and at the same time almost 45% bigger than in 2008). However, considering that Australia rarely spent even 2% of its GDP on military purposes, this situation is not surprising. What is noteworthy among the countries surveyed is that only Pakistan spends less on this objective.

The most interesting study case, however, is China. Although their military spending to GDP ratio is lower than that of other countries except for Japan (amounts to approximately 2,0% and since 1992 never exceeded 2,2% GDP), due to the rapid economic growth China has managed to expand its military budget twenty-two times since 1989. What further attracts our attention is how China compares to other countries in this group regarding the military outlays. In 1989 it ranked far behind the United States, but as soon as in 2005, China overtook Japan and became the world's second-largest country by defense budget. At the same time, the gap between China and the US is ever decreasing: in 1989, the PRC's defense budget constituted roughly 3,5% of the budget of the Pentagon, whereas, in 2018, it accounted for over 38% (at the same time is higher than that of all other countries in consideration combined). As one can see, the difference, however, in the defense outlays between the two countries is still significant. The fact that China's military

budget has grown almost by 2100% in the considered period (over 185% in the last decade) reflects the scale of the rearmament and modernization process that is taking place in the RPC. The reason for this military build-up, as it was mentioned earlier, is Beijing's aspiration to play an important role in Asia and the Pacific, but also at the world's level, to which purpose a modern army, capable of operating in any place, is indispensable. It is worth pointing out the prognosis for 2020 – RAND estimates the maximum size of the Chinese defense budget at \$287 billion, while IHS Jane's is \$ 260 billion³⁸.

Summarizing Analysis

In the first chapter, it has been shown that Chinese military expenditure has been rapidly increasing in the last quarter of the century, particularly if compared to other countries. In the period under consideration, the Chinese military budget has grown by twenty-two times, whereas in Russia, the US, and Japan, the increase in military spending has been symbolic. It is undoubtedly a chance for China to reinforce its regional and global position. The latest events, i.e. creating the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or coming up with the New Silk Road initiative, demonstrate that China wants to be a more important player on the global scene and is determined to adopt a more aggressive policy towards the US to attain this objective. A dynamic built-up of China's armed forces indicates that it will potentially be ready to pose a challenge for the US in the military field before long.

Undoubtedly, China's growing defense budget at an impressive pace and the resulting modernization of armed forces such as airforce, navy, strategic forces, and, last but not least, cyber-arms could create a security dilemma among the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. However, the PRC's defense budget in 2018 was at the level of Australia (1.9%) in proportion to GDP, and since the end of the Cold War, it has practically not shown any upward trends³⁹. Moreover, when analyzing the military spending dynamics over the last nearly thirty years, it would be difficult to conclude that one of the countries sees the development of the Chinese military power as a significant threat. Apart from short-term anomalies (the USA in 2008–2012 and Russia after 2010), it is impossible to observe a permanent reaction in the form of significantly increased defense spending. In Russia's case, it should be explicitly

³⁸ M. Adamczyk, P. Rutkowska, *op.cit.*, p. 89.

³⁹ Of course, with the exception that the SIPRI experts have managed to estimate the Chinese military expenditure properly, because Beijing is effectively concealing its actual size.

stated that the significant increase in the defense budget was related to the war in Ukraine and Syria, in which the country was directly involved. Therefore, taking into account only the data on military expenditures, it should be stated that the actions of the most important states in the region in Asia and the Pacific do not point to the existence of a dilemma, let alone a security paradox. Thus, the first thesis put forward at the beginning of this article is falsified. In the authors' opinion, this is an interesting observation because analyzing only the declarations of leaders or experts can get the impression that we are dealing with at least a new Cold War in the Asia-Pacific region.

Do the leading countries in the region respond differently from internal balancing to Beijing's revisionist tendencies? Is there already a tendency for external balancing or bandwagoning among them? It is worth remembering that the United States has already made at least one attempt at the internal and external balancing of China over the last decade, the so-called "Pivot to Asia" (hence the increase in expenditure between 2008 and 2012), which in many respects has been a moderate success⁴⁰. One of these reasons was the US's need to re-engage in Europe and the Middle East in connection with Russia's aggression against Ukraine or its participation in the war in Syria. Will the US then make another attempt soon to build a balancing coalition? There is much to suggest that such a process is already underway. As part of the "five-eye" coalition, Washington is strengthening its intelligence cooperation against China⁴¹ and successfully strengthening its existing alliance with Japan⁴² and with some difficulties with Australia⁴³ and Korea⁴⁴.

⁴⁰ V. Cha, *The Unfinished Legacy of Obama's Pivot to Asia*, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/06/the-unfinished-legacy-of-obamas-pivot-to-asia/>; J. Ford, *The Pivot to Asia Was Obama's Biggest Mistake*, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/the-pivot-to-asia-was-obamas-biggest-mistake/>.

⁴¹ N. Barkin, *Exclusive: Five Eyes intelligence alliance builds coalition to counter China*, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-fiveeyes/exclusive-five-eyes-intelligence-alliance-builds-coalition-to-counter-china-idUSKCN1MM0GH>. CNBC, *Five Eyes intelligence alliance builds coalition to counter China*. <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/12/five-eyes-intelligence-alliance-builds-coalition-to-counter-china.html>.

⁴² H. Kusumoto, *US-Japan alliance must strengthen as tensions rise in Asia, defense experts say*, <https://www.stripes.com/news/us-japan-alliance-must-strengthen-as-tensions-rise-in-asia-defense-experts-say-1.573797>; A. Hammond, *Shinzo Abe moves to fortify US alliance in face of China's rise*, <https://gulfnws.com/opinion/op-eds/shinzo-abe-moves-to-fortify-us-alliance-in-face-of-chinas-rise-1.64177425>.

⁴³ D. Wroe, *Australia-US alliance needs to evolve as China rises, experts say*, <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/australia-us-alliance-needs-to-evolve-as-china-rises-experts-say-20190612-p51wy7.html>; J. Curran, *How Morrison Won - and What His Win Means for the U.S.-Australia Alliance*, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/how-morrison-won-and-what-his-win-means-us-australia-alliance>.

⁴⁴ K. Lee, *It's Time for the U.S.-South Korea Alliance to Evolve*, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/its-time-us-south-korea-alliance-evolve-41272>; A.M. Denmark, *The U.S.-ROK Alliance and Policy Coordination Toward China*, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/us-rok-alliance-and-policy-coordination-toward-china>.

On the other hand, some of the weaker countries in the region, even if they fear the growth of Chinese power, for many reasons, do not necessarily want to balance China with America⁴⁵. An example of such a country is the Philippines, which in recent years seemed even to be bandwagon to China, but the aggressive policy of the latter toward the disputed islets in the South China Sea caused Manila, at least in the declarative sphere, to rejoin the balancing of the PRC⁴⁶. The situation is similar to Vietnam, which has already experienced a Chinese invasion at least once, but has still not decided on a far-reaching rapprochement with the USA⁴⁷ – an essential factor, in this case, may be Hanoi's close economic and military relations with Moscow⁴⁸. On the other hand, equally close relations with Russia did not prevent India from entering into a *de facto* alliance with the United States⁴⁹, which, as could have been expected, was more than content because of New Delhi's conduct – especially in the face of Washington's deteriorating relations with Islamabad. Pakistan is the most glaring example of a state in the Asia-Pacific region, which, despite previous close relations with the US, for various reasons, is increasingly inclined to bandwagon to China. Thailand is an interesting case since it pursues a policy of equal distance to both powers⁵⁰, although it was undoubtedly a close ally of Washington beforehand. The countries in the region that are bandwagoning toward China are Russia⁵¹, Iran,

⁴⁵ D. Wroe, *op.cit.*

⁴⁶ R. Heydarian, *How Washington's ambiguity in South China Sea puts the Philippine-US alliance at a crossroads*, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2184390/how-washingtons-ambiguity-south-china-sea-puts-philippine-us>; R. Jennings, *Philippines Edges Back into US Alliance as New Friend China Stirs Anger*, <https://www.voanews.com/east-asia/philippines-edges-back-us-alliance-new-friend-china-stirs-anger>; R. Pickrell, *A close ally is terrified the US will drag it into a 'shooting war' with China in the South China Sea*, <https://www.businessinsider.com/us-ally-questions-alliance-over-growing-risk-of-war-in-south-china-sea-2019-3?IR=T>.

⁴⁷ E. Albert, *The Evolution of U.S. – Vietnam Ties*, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/evolution-us-vietnam-ties>; X. Loc Doan, *US, Vietnam strategic partners in all but name*, <https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/04/opinion/us-vietnam-strategic-partners-in-all-but-name/>.

⁴⁸ T. Onishi, *Vietnam and Russia expand joint South China Sea gas projects*, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Vietnam-and-Russia-expand-joint-South-China-Sea-gas-projects>.

⁴⁹ A. Withnall, *US and India sign 'breakthrough' military agreement despite differences over Iran and Russia*, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/us-india-military-deal-iran-russia-trump-modi-putin-a8525736.html>; A. Ayres, *What Next for U.S.-India Military Ties?*, <https://www.cfr.org/article/what-next-us-india-military-ties>.

⁵⁰ D. Green, *Thailand pushes China's Belt and Road despite differing visions*, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and-Road/Thailand-pushes-China-s-Belt-and-Road-despite-differing-visions>; B. Harding, *Moving the U.S.-Thailand Alliance Forward*, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/moving-us-thailand-alliance-forward>.

⁵¹ B. Mações, *Russia to China: Together we can rule the world*, <https://www.politico.eu/blogs/the-coming-wars/2019/02/russia-china-alliance-rule-the-world/>; A. Korolev, *On the Verge of an Alliance: Contemporary China-Russia Military Cooperation*, "Asian Security" 2018, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 233–252.

Sri Lanka⁵², and some Central Asian countries⁵³. In the light of the above statements, it seems legitimate to state that the second of the presented research hypotheses has been confirmed in principle – the United States and some of its existing allies seek to balance China, which is increasingly visible in its attempts to undermine the *status quo* in the international system and demonstrate hegemonic aspirations. The balancing coalition is joined by countries that have not previously been closely associated with the USA (India, and perhaps Vietnam in the future). On the other hand, some American allies are chosen by bandwagon to China. According to the authors, an interesting subject of research would be a full review of the relations between all Asian and Pacific countries and the USA and China, so that on the eve of a potential clash between the two powers, one could describe the placement of metaphorical figures on an Asian chessboard.

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⁵² M.K. Bhadrakumar, *China Extends Helping Hand To Sri Lanka*, <https://orientalreview.org/2019/05/18/china-extends-helping-hand-to-sri-lanka/>; K. Lo, *A Chinese flag flies over Sri Lanka as China extends its reach into India's backyard*, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2126897/chinese-flag-flies-over-sri-lanka-china-extends-its>.

⁵³ P. Goble, *China Will Have Military Bases in Central Asia Within Five Years, Russian Expert Says*, <https://jamestown.org/program/china-will-have-military-bases-in-central-asia-within-five-years-russian-expert-says/>; U. Hashimova, *Why Central Asia Is Betting on China's Belt and Road*, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/why-central-asia-is-betting-on-chinas-belt-and-road/>.

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The Clash Between China and the United States and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region – A Security Dilemma, a Balance of Power and the Bandwagon Effect

Summary

This article attempts to answer the question about the security situation in the Asia-Pacific region. The authors decided to verify the authenticity of the thesis that Asia witnessed the birth of a new security dilemma based on the data on the amount of defense spending among the key countries of the region (China, the United States, Japan, Russia, Pakistan, Australia, and India). The second thesis that the authors want to confirm or reject is that there is a coalition in the Asia-Pacific area that is creating a balance of power and, at the same time, a growing number of countries that want to join the PRC. To this end, the authors have used a content analysis method and a comparative method. The first chapter is a brief description of the article's theoretical framework in the form of a realistic current in international relations and security research and an explanation of the concepts of power balance, security dilemma, and bandwagoning applied. The second chapter presents data on the defense spending of the most important actors in the region. In the third chapter, which is a substitute for a conclusion, the authors will analyze the situation in the Asia-Pacific region using the previously presented theoretical approach and empirical data.

Keywords: Asia-Pacific region, security problem, balance of power, joining a stronger one

Столкновение между Китаем и Соединенными Штатами и безопасность в Азиатско-Тихоокеанском регионе – дилемма безопасности, баланс сил и эффект «бандвагона»

Резюме

Данная статья представляет собой попытку ответить на вопрос о ситуации в области безопасности в Азиатско-Тихоокеанском регионе. Авторы решили проверить правдивость тезиса о том, что в Азии возникла новая дилемма безопасности, основанная на данных о расходах на оборону среди ключевых стран региона (Китай, США, Япония, Россия, Пакистан, Австралия и Индия). Второй тезис, который авторы хотят подтвердить или опровергнуть, заключается в том, что в Азиатско-Тихоокеанском регионе существует коалиция, которая формирует коалицию, нацеленную на балансирование сил, и в то же время растет число стран, желающих присоединиться к КНР. Для этого авторы использовали метод контент-анализа и сравнительный метод. Первая глава представляет собой краткое описание теоретических основ статьи в виде реалистичного течения в международных отношениях и исследованиях в области безопасности, а также объяснение прикладных концепций баланса сил, дилеммы безопасности и переплетения. Во второй главе представлены данные о расходах на оборону наиболее важных субъектов в регионе. В третьей главе, которая заменяет собой окончание, авторы проанализируют ситуацию в Азиатско-Тихоокеанском регионе, используя ранее представленный теоретический подход и эмпирические данные.

Ключевые слова: Азиатско-Тихоокеанский регион, дилемма безопасности, равновесие сил, связь с более сильными