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**POLISH AND GERMAN VISIONS
ON THE FUTURE
OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE**

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ABSTRACT: The transformations of the North Atlantic Alliance in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and its mission in Afghanistan have proceeded hand in hand with the redefining of security interests in individual member states. Poland and Germany have also been affected by a polarization of views, particularly on the nature, place and role of NATO in today's world. The countries' geopolitics and their varying visions of European security have significantly affected their positions.

Upon its accession to NATO 15 years ago, Poland counted on the Alliance to strengthen its collective defense capabilities. Germany, which had initiated the enlargement debate within the Alliance and supported Poland's bid to join NATO and the EU, expected this would help it align with Russia and establish a new pan-European security architecture. A comparison of the views and opinions expressed in Poland and Germany on the 15th anniversary of NATO's enlargement at a time when the US is pivoting to the Pacific while the Ukrainian conflict is becoming ever more aggravated, sheds light on the countries' approach (their commitments to building a tight political partnership) towards the fundamental dilemma in trans-Atlantic relations which is whether the North Atlantic Alliance will continue to play a significant role as a guardian of security in the Western world. The big challenge is to find ways to continue military integration and prevent the gradual transformation of NATO into a caf-

eteria-type alliance summoned on demand to intervene in regional crises such as those seen in Libya and Mali, where it helps small coalitions overwhelmed by powers backed up by strong military forces.

Differences of opinion among allies fall into three separate categories. One comprises countries referred to as *reformist* which include the U.S., the UK, Canada and Denmark.¹ Such countries advocate reforming NATO to better prepare it to respond to greater challenges such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, mainly in the global dimension. Their primary postulate is to expand mission capabilities by acquiring the ability to perform new tasks. The US and the United Kingdom see the military aspect as crucial for forging a new strategy for the Alliance. They believe that the NATO Response Force should strengthen NATO's ability to respond to new threats. NATO's usefulness for the US has increasingly meant having its allies follow it in building military capabilities to perform out-of-area operations. This does not mean that the US has completely abandoned the ideal of collective defense. The Obama administration assures that Article 5 will remain "the heart and soul of NATO".² It is nevertheless clear that, in the view of the United States, defending Europe against an unlikely conventional attack has taken a back seat to its interests in the Middle East and Central Asia due to growing international security challenges in that region. On the other hand, the threat of Iran developing a nuclear program has driven Obama administration to continue developing the missile-defense system to defend its allies, although the system was originally intended to protect the USA. Thus, in a sense, the project has offset the reformist preference for out-of-area operations. This second category of states has also been referred to as *globalists*,³ as they advocate having the Alliance engage in global partnerships. The Alliance adopted this approach to international

¹ T. Noetzel, B. Schreer, *Does a multi-tier NATO matter? The Atlantic alliance and the process of strategic change*, "International Affairs" 2009, Vol. 85, No. 2, pp. 211–226.

² S. McNamara, *NATO Summit 2010: Time to Turn Words Into Action, Backgrounder*. Published by The Heritage Foundation, No. 2498, 10.12.2010, p. 2.

³ B. Górka-Winter, M. Madej, *Wstęp*, in: B. Górka-Winter, M. Madej (eds.), *Państwa członkowskie NATO wobec nowej koncepcji strategicznej Sojuszu. Przegląd stanowisk*, The Polish Institute for International Affairs 2010, p. 7.

cooperation even earlier as it forged partnerships with Australia and Japan.⁴ The importance of this program was demonstrated by the ISAF operation in Afghanistan which involved more NATO partners than its members. Other than Australia and Japan, the most significant of the partners were South Korea and New Zealand. The persisting question is how and to what extent the partner states should be allowed to influence decisions regarding Alliance operations. Previously, the United States proposed that NATO strive to spread liberal and democratic values and gradually become an alliance of democracies.⁵ Little by little, the US swayed towards making the Alliance a patron or the hub of global security networks. In other words, the point was to make NATO conclude not only partnerships with individual member states but also engage in various international organizations having a wide range of interests and fields of operation so as to indirectly inspire them to assume more responsibility for security matters.⁶ The idea of expanding partnerships tied closely to the development of civilian aspects of the Alliance's external actions. Affected by poor results in coordinating the Afghanistan reconstruction effort, the reformers believed that NATO should evolve into an institution which not only supplies armed forces but also influences political solutions for crisis-stricken areas, i.e. wanted stronger influence over the political process and reconstruction.⁷ According to Obama's administration, NATO should therefore develop civilian missions and, specifically,

⁴ "Partnerships with non-NATO countries", http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51103.htm (accessed: 30.06.2014).

⁵ I. Daalder, J. Goldgeier, *Global NATO*, "Foreign Affairs", September–October 2006, pp. 105–13.

⁶ R. Weitz, *The NATO Global Hub*, 13.09.2012, <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-nato-global-hub-by-richard-weitz> (accessed: 30.06.2014); I. Daalder, *A New Alliance for a New Century*, "The RUSI Journal" October/November 2010, Vol. 155, No. 5, p. 10.

⁷ B. Schreer, *Challenges and prospects for NATO "Complex Operations"*, in: Chr. M. Schnaubelt (ed.), *Complex Operations: NATO at war and on the margins of war*, NATO Defense College "NDC Forum Papers Series", July 2010, pp. 210–211; S. McNamara, *op.cit.*, p. 10.

establish special civilian operation planning units.⁸ For that reason, NATO needs a settled relationship with civilian actors with whom it should work together to avert new threats. These include the United Nations, the European Union, the World Bank and non-governmental organizations. NATO needs to work together with the states and organizations which hold the kinds of resources that are lacking in the Alliance. The reformers have suggested that a special agreement, referred to as Berlin Plus in reverse,⁹ be forged between NATO and the EU to bring the two organizations closer together and adopt a total approach. The arrangement would provide NATO with access to the EU's civilian capabilities for its own operational purposes. It referred back to a prior 2003 understanding named Berlin Plus between NATO and the EU which provided a framework for NATO-EU cooperation whereby NATO committed to make its resources and military capabilities (military planning and command) available for EU's operations.

Another category are the so called status quo countries. These include Germany as well as France and the South European countries of Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece.¹⁰ Germany and France, which are not opposed to NATO's collective defense function, continue to see it as essential for the Alliance's further existence. They were concerned, however, with suggestions made by Central and Eastern European member states, particularly Poland and Baltic countries, stressing the need to deepen the collective defense commitment laid down in art. 5 of the Washington Treaty, i.e. the so called reassur-

⁸ H. Clinton, *Atlantic Council of the United States*, "Hillary Clinton: NATO's Future", 22.02.2010, <http://www.acus.org/event/hillary-clinton-future-nato> (accessed: 30.06.2014).

⁹ M.A. Laborie Iglesias, *NATO-EU Cooperation in the Atlantic Alliance's Future Strategic Concept*, Real Instituto Elcano, Area: Security and Defense, "ARI" 2010, No. 25.

¹⁰ B. Górká, M. Madej, *Wstęp...*, p. 8; P. Jonson *The debate about Article 5 and its credibility. What is it all about?* Research Paper, Research Division – NATO Defense College 2010, Rome, No. 58, p. 8.

ance.¹¹ Germany believed that the Alliance was not at risk of being attacked by Russia. It cultivates its relations with Russia and, as of recently, seeks to have it included in the joint missile defense system.¹²

On the other hand, the expansion of the out-of-area function would have far-reaching implications for the relationship between the status quo countries and the USA. The former differ from the US in advocating that NATO only use moderate military force to avert threats and only resort to such force on the condition that the UN Security Council grant it a specific operational mandate. They rule out any repeated “Kosovo wars”. Their fear is that the US might use the Alliance to legitimize its growing engagements around the globe making it “the world’s policeman”.¹³ On the other hand, the countries would like to keep the USA from favoring the coalition of the willing over its NATO obligations the way it did after 9/11. Hence, status quo advocates conditionally accept US leadership as long as they are consulted regarding any decisions to be made by the US as they hoped they would be under the Obama presidency.

Germany and France wish to exert more influence on NATO’s development. It was most likely to that end that France again supported NATO’s military force in 2009. It nevertheless stopped short of increasing its contribution to ISAF operations. Germany, in its turn, unable to change its substantial qualitative military engagement in Afghanistan, has found itself in a position of greater significance for the Alliance. Another hindrance on the way to improving relations with the US is Germany’s approach to nuclear disarmament: both the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition during its term and, more recently, its cur-

¹¹ N. Busse, *Krieg gegen Russland? Die Nato diskutiert über die Lehren aus dem Georgien-Konflikt*, “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung”, 3.11.2008.

¹² *Berlin und Paris einig über NATO-Strategie*, “Süddeutsche Zeitung”, 19.11.2010.

¹³ *Die NATO kann nicht als Weltpolizist eingesetzt werden*. Interview with former head of the NATO Military Committee retired general Harald Kujat, “Deutschlandfunk”, 03.04.2009, http://www.dradio.de/dlf/sendungen/interview_dlf/945089 (accessed: 30.06.2014).

rent government, have been demanding that the US withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from German territory. What further complicates Germany's relations with the Obama administration is its hardline approach to disarmament adopted in the belief that, if put up within the NATO framework, the missile defense system will make the nuclear deterrents redundant.¹⁴

The status quo countries have sought to have the EU recognized as an equal partner of the US and to turn NATO into a casual forum for political dialogue between the US and Europe treating each other as equal strategic partners. However, even if the Common Security and Defense Policy seems to have gained some appeal, NATO nevertheless remains of value for Germany and, to an extent for France, owing to the USA's commitment to protecting Europe. NATO is a forum in which the European member states may pursue their frequently divergent interests.

The status quo countries' opposition to the Alliance's globalization is driven by considerations similar to those invoked with respect to the expansion of NATO deployment capabilities.¹⁵ The countries argue that by following this vision, NATO may well undermine the monopoly of the United Nations. They were also skeptical about the idea of a global NATO as a project that is excessively competitive with Russia and China. They feared, in particular, that changes of this sort would drag NATO into the ongoing dispute over Asia's superiority between the USA and China, especially if Asian partner countries seek to secure NATO support. For Germany and France, a direct opposite of the radical globalization program is that of mending relationships between the USA and the European member states within that framework.¹⁶ They postulate that NATO

¹⁴ M. Paul, *Raketenabwehr: Probleme und Chancen für die NATO-Russland-Beziehungen*, "SWP-Aktuell" 2012 June, Vol. 35.

¹⁵ M.T., *Niemcy*, in: B. Górka-Winter, M. Madej (eds.), *Państwa członkowskie NATO wobec nowej koncepcji strategicznej Sojuszu. Przegląd stanowisk*, The Polish Institute for International Affairs 2010, p. 71.

¹⁶ *Regierungserklärung von Angela Merkel zum Nato-Gipfel*, 26.03.2009, <http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Service/Suche/Volltext/volltext.html?search=globale%20Herausforderungen%20in%20deutschland&sortString=date&do=search&pc=1&sp=20> (accessed: 30.06.2014). Chancellor A. Merkel: "Ich sehe keine globale NATO.

become a key forum of trans-Atlantic dialogue by virtue of art. 4 of the Washington Treaty which would add such non-military considerations as energy and economic security to the common agenda.

Both the globalist and the status quo countries have thus far seen eye to eye on the issue of developing closer ties with Russia. Germany and France have advocated engaging Russia even at the expense of the further enlargement of the Alliance. They expressed this opinion earlier at the April 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest when, with Poland's support, they opposed the US on the issue of launching a Membership Action Plan for Ukraine and Georgia. As this precautionary position was reinforced even further in the face of the Ukrainian crisis, the prospect of Ukraine's membership has become more elusive than ever before.

The third category of states are *the coalition of Article 5 defenders*¹⁷ made up of such Central and Eastern European countries as Poland, the Baltic countries and, to a certain extent, Norway. Its sympathizers are Iceland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.¹⁸ *Article 5 defenders* prefer an Article-5-focused alliance which maintains a defense capability against conventional threats. They envision the collective defense function as the groundwork for the future Alliance. The Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008, Russian army's exercises, including a simulated nuclear attack on Poland in 2009, as well as Russia's aggression on the Crimea in 2014, have upset Central and Eastern European member states.¹⁹ These called for alliance guarantees to be made more credible by establishing

Die Allianz ist und bleibt vornehmlich auf die kollektive Sicherheit der nordatlantischen Partner konzentriert. Sehr wohl heißt das heute auch, dass sie Sicherheit gegebenenfalls außerhalb ihres Bündnisgebietes sichern muss. Aber das heißt eben nicht, dass Staaten rund um den Globus Mitglieder werden können, sondern dass dies von Mitgliedstaaten aus dem transatlantischen Raum geleistet wird.“

¹⁷ B. Górka-Winter, M. Madej, op.cit., p. 7.

¹⁸ P. Jonson, *The debate about Article 5 and its credibility. What is all about?*, Research Paper, Research Division – NATO Defense College 2010, Rome, No. 58, p. 4.

¹⁹ M. Day, *Russia “Simulates” Nuclear Attack on Poland*, “The Daily Telegraph”, 1.11.2009, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/poland/6480227/Russia-simulates-nuclear-attack-on-Poland.html> (accessed: 30.06.2014).

a mechanism that would make their application inevitable.²⁰ The reassurances they demanded concerned updating contingency plans for external aggression, strengthening NATO presence in the region by creating a proper alliance infrastructure and holding joint military exercises.²¹

Russia has objected to the position of Poland and the Baltic states arguing that the Founding Act of 1997 on mutual relations between NATO and the Russian Federation ruled out not only the stationing of nuclear weapons in NATO's new member states but also the deployment of the Alliance's larger military forces. In its claims, Russia ignored NATO's declaration, as enshrined in the Act, to deploy troops in new member states and hold joint exercises to ensure their armed forces are interoperable with those of the Alliance.²² This notwithstanding, Russia's protests received the partial support of Germany and France.²³

The call for reassurance converged with the positions of Poland and the Czech Republic on the key issue of nuclear defense, deterrence and disarmament. Poland and the Czech Republic expressed backed the previous version of the missile defense shield, as advocated by the Bush administration (i.e. by agreement with the USA to be made outside of NATO) as well as the version proposed by Obama administration following September 2009 (i.e. as part of the NATO missile defense system with which the US component would be integrated). Furthermore, the two states expressed concerns over Germany's view, expressed in 2009, on the pullout of American tactical nuclear weapons from Europe as excessively one-sided and having the potential to increase Russia's already massive

²⁰ *Niech NATO działa z automatu*. Interview with Jerzy M. Nowak, former ambassador of Poland to NATO, Vice-President of the Euro-Atlantic Association. "Gazeta Wyborcza", 27.10.2010.

²¹ *Poland's Priorities in the Debate on a New Strategic Concept for NATO*, "PISM Strategic Files" 2010, No. 12.

²² *Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation*, signed in Paris, France, 27.05.1997, http://www.nato.int/cps/environment/natolive/official_texts_25468.htm (accessed: 30.06.2014).

²³ R. Asmus, et al., *NATO, new allies and reassurance*, Centre for European Reform, May 2010, p. 2.

nuclear advantage even further. The position had to be considered by the proponents of NATO reform.²⁴

Germany's line, as actively pursued by the CDU/CSU/FDP government's Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle,²⁵ constitutes an evident complication for Polish security interests. As the Alliance's front country, Poland is interested in having the Russian Federation's tactical weapon stockpiles reduced under a broad diplomatic agreement to eliminate Russia's disproportionate advantage in this type of weaponry. Poland's position, therefore, is a far cry from the unilateral disarmament proposed by Germany. The CDU/CSU/SPD government nevertheless continues to tacitly uphold the position of its predecessors.

Given their preference for collective defense, Poland as well as the new NATO member states view out-of-area tasks (which the reformers propose to make a priority) as a secondary consideration. The Ukrainian issue has only strengthened this approach. Out-of-area tasks may not be allowed to adversely affect NATO's defensive capabilities. Hence Poland only agreed to back the build-up of deployment capabilities on the condition that NATO's Response Forces would additionally become available for use in defensive purposes in a *casus foederis*. A similar position, although for a whole different set of reasons, was assumed by Germany whose preference was to develop measures within the framework of the Common Security and Defense Policy. As for partnerships, Poland converged with Germany in advocating regional rather than global collaboration. With respect to the Comprehensive Approach, Poland chose to support the reformers who sought tighter cooperation with the EU in organizing joint missions.

By and large, Poland and Germany differ on a number of issues. The greatest amount of skepticism has arisen over the postulate for reassurances. Germany sees Article 5 to be more of a political declaration than a security guarantee which requires practical measures to back it up.

²⁴ *Mind the Gap. Healing the NATO rift over US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe*, British American Security Information Council, January 2010, p. 3.

²⁵ T. Hecht, *Germany and its American Nukes*, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies Johns Hopkins University, 12.09.2012.

Neither was there unanimity on missile defense, particularly regarding the withdrawal of US tactical weapons from Europe. Another contentious issue was the accession into NATO by Ukraine and Georgia, especially prior to the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008. Germany's overall position on the above concerns followed from the country's historically maintained presumption about the need to integrate Russia with the Euro-Atlantic security policy and bring the security relationship with Russia to a higher level at any cost as well as the belief that it is critical to develop the European security policy, i.e. strengthen Europe's defense capabilities within the EU and redefine NATO as an Alliance of the EU and the USA.

However, new squabbles replaced the old. Between 2005 and 2007, Poland's Law & Justice government headed by Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz and Jarosław Kaczyński stepped up the effort to conclude an agreement with the US to build a missile base in Poland as part of the missile defense system designed to protect US territory against ballistic missile attacks. Continued by the government of the Civil Platform and the Polish People's Alliance under the leadership of Prime Minister Donald Tusk, the negotiations resulted in the conclusion of an agreement with the USA on August 20, 2008. In Poland's view, the missile defense shield was a bilateral concern of Poland and the US – the idea was to tighten cooperation with the USA in the field of security and increase America's political engagement with Poland and as part of its trans-Atlantic relations. Poland's aim was to achieve an additional bilateral security guarantee beyond that offered by NATO. It never considered that such an approach would create a precedent in Europe. After all, European partners maintain more or less intimate relations with the USA regardless of their bonds within the Northatlantic Alliance. Such countries include the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. France and the UK, both of which are nuclear powers, independently modify their nuclear strategies not as much out of consideration for their EU partners but rather in response to the changing global environment. The claims, heard in Europe, that countries which take such actions undermine European unity as they engage in the American defense system, were only an example of patronizing Poland and a convenient interpretation of the hierarchy of European states. As for the official relations between the two countries,

the position of the CDU/CSU/SPD government on missile defense and the desired Polish-German consultations on European security, was completely overshadowed by a spat over the future of the EU's constitutional treaty and the European Union's voting system as well as the serious dispute over history, the role of the displaced and the commemoration of the displacement of Germans from Poland.

The German CDU/CSU/FDFP government viewed the matter in terms of its European security prerogatives, German-Russian relations and, needless to say, the implications that the initiative might have for USA's role in Europe and specifically for German-American relations as well as, as has been claimed, for the threat of dividing Europe.²⁶ Hence, Germany remained restrained in its official statements. This was plain to see in Germany's reservations stated before the Alliance (during member state meetings in April 2007). Some members of the German political establishment saw the US initiative as an attempt to dominate Europe and believed that Germany should have greater influence over the project or be more involved in its implementation. The CDU/CSU/SPD coalition government saw the initiative as a source of complications and rifts in Europe rather than an added value for the Alliance's security. As a matter of fact, the German government was sharply divided on the issue. Whereas the Christian Democrats regarded the project quite favorably,²⁷ Social Democrats pointed out the inherent security risks which the missile defense shield project could pose for European-Russian relations.²⁸ They were also concerned about the new arms race. The dividing line ran across the spheres of influence in governmental administration. The SPD-led Ministry of Foreign Affairs approached the missile defense issue by noting the possible harm to relations with Russia while the CDU-controlled Ministry of Defense remained much more open to collaboration, especially that the

²⁶ Th. Jäger, D. Dylla, *Ballistic Missile Defense und polnische Sicherheitsinteressen*, in: Th. Jäger, D. Dylla (eds.), *Deutschland und Polen. Die europäische und internationale Politik*, Wiesbaden 2008, p. 312 and ff.

²⁷ E. g. K. Lamers, (CDU/CSU), *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages*, Plenarprotokolle. 17/92, 30.03.2007.

²⁸ E. g. F.-W. Steinmaier, *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages*, Plenarprotokolle, 17/87, 30.03.2007.

project was to increase the combat capabilities of the Bundeswehr. In 2008, the Chancellor's Office subscribed to the opinion that the German involvement in the construction of the missile defense shield should be seen in terms of technological cooperation and the Alliance's commitments. As these aspects began to prevail in 2008, Germany offered its moderate support for the project.²⁹ The perfect solution for Germany was to make the shield issue NATO business, i.e. bring the American initiative into the NATO framework so as to establish a regional missile defense system. At NATO's Bucharest Summit of April 2008, Germany overcame its misgivings and joined the other member states in supporting the idea to build a missile defense shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. Germany's preference, however, remained to be for a system designed by various member state consortia within NATO. In cooperation with the USA and Italy, Germany conducted work in the MEADS (Medium Extended Air Defense System) program developing a medium-range-missile defense system capable of destroying missiles with range of up to 1000 kilometers. This defense system was to become a component of another missile defense system known as ALTBMD (Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense) which NATO was planning to build and which would be used as part of the architecture designed to defend the territories of North Atlantic Alliance member states.

One of the reasons why the Obama administration abandoned the shield project in September 2009 was its famous reset of relations with Russia which played conveniently into the hands of Chancellor Angela Merkel's CDU/CSU/FDP government. The USA made an additional commitment to build the missile defense system as part of a broader agreement with its allies with an important role reserved for Poland and a truly central one set out for the new member state of Romania. The USA was prepared to go even further and seek an understanding with Russia on the matter. Its flexible approach received the support of the CDU/CSU/FDP government which made no secret of the fact that the continued construc-

²⁹ B. Schreer, *Challenges and prospects for NATO "Complex Operations"*, in: Chr.M. Schnaubelt (ed.), *Complex Operations: NATO at war and on the margins of war*, NATO Defense College "NDC Forum Papers Series", July 2010, p. 69.

tion of the system within NATO and the achievement of a *modus vivendi* with Russia on the issue was in its vital interest when it came to developing the missile defense system. Germany would reiterate this position at the Brussels summit of defense ministers held in October 2010³⁰ and subsequently at the NATO summit in Lisbon on November 19–21, 2010.³¹ Nevertheless, Germany remained anxious about Russia's response and was quite relieved with the US decision to abandon any future installation of latest-generation missiles in Poland.

From the viewpoint of Polish security interests, Germany's support for Russia's involvement in the missile defense system was fairly unclear. Poland's misgivings concerned excessively yielding to Russian demands for being assigned a defense responsibility zone in Central Europe motivated by Russia's desire to rise to a disproportionately privileged position in the project. As Germany sees its Russian relations as a priority, it is certainly interested in tightening them with the use of the missile defense system while giving NATO-Russia relations in security matters a new momentum. Ultimately, the key factor is the position taken by the Obama administration which so far has not been entirely unclear.

To recapitulate, the common German policy line of catering to Russia's interests in pursuing innovative concepts for developing NATO policies (enlargement as stability exports, missile defense shield) and Germany's reluctance towards Polish reassurance postulates (calling for the "renewal" and strengthening of the collective defense function) as the Alliance's key binding force and its primary mission, have never been aligned with the Polish position on the future of NATO. In calling for denuclearization, Germany has ignored Russia's massive advantage over NATO in tactical weapons in Europe. The call has shown indirectly that Germans prefer to see NATO as an organization which institutionalizes political cooperation, also in relations with Russia, rather than one which requires its members constantly to renew their collective defense commitments. In creating its security policy in relation to Poland, Germany has been restricted by Rus-

³⁰ *Germany backs NATO plan for missile-defense shield*, 14.10.2010, <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,6111015,00.html> (accessed: 30.06.2014).

³¹ O. Thränert, *NATO and missile defence: Opportunities and open questions*, "CSS Analysis in Security Policy" 2010, No. 86, p. 1.

sian considerations and by its highly inclusive approach to Russia which has actually become part and parcel of Germany's foreign policy. The approach was manifested in part during the Ukrainian crisis when the CDU/CSU/SPD government made a strong appeal for respecting Russia's interests in the EU forum.

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