


Sāṃkhya on the Validity (*prāmāṇya*) and Invalidity (*aprāmāṇya*) of Cognition

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Abstract: One of the well-known polemics of Indian thought, in which many *darśanas* participated, is concerned with the problem of the validity (*prāmāṇya*) and invalidity (*aprāmāṇya*) of cognition (*jñāna*). The problem has two main aspects: the origination and ascertainment of validity and invalidity. Mādhava's *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* and other external sources attribute to Sāṃkhya (a tradition of thought recognising the authority of the Vedas) the view that both validity and invalidity are intrinsic, and many researchers hold that this view is Sāṃkhyan. In this article, I reconstruct the Sāṃkhya view on validity and invalidity of cognition on the basis of classical and postclassical Sāṃkhya texts, that is, all extant Sāṃkhya texts from Īsvaraḥṣṇa's *Sāṃkhyakārikā* to Aniruddha's *Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti*. I come to the conclusion that the Sāṃkhya view is different from the view attributed to Sāṃkhya. According to Sāṃkhya texts, validity is intrinsic and invalidity is extrinsic in terms of both origination and ascertainment.

Keywords: Sāṃkhya, means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), validity (*prāmāṇya*) and invalidity (*aprāmāṇya*) of cognition (*jñāna*), intrinsic (*svatas*) validity, extrinsic (*paratas*) invalidity

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1. Introduction

1.1. The problem and key terms

One of the liveliest yet most intricate polemics in Indian epistemology is concerned with the problem of the origin and ascertainment of the validity (*prāmāṇya*) and invalidity (*aprāmāṇya*) of cognition (*jñāna*). The problem was formulated by the 7th-century Mīmāṃsā philosopher Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa,¹

¹ According to KATAOKA 2016: 558(5), Kumāriḷa was 'active around the first half of the seventh century (600–650 AD)'.

who also defended the Mīmāṃsā position and criticised other possible solutions of this problem, thus initiating one of the most famous polemics in Indian thought. Almost all Indian philosophical traditions participated in this discussion. Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, Advaita Vedānta, Buddhism, and Jainism were among the main contributors.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and the philosophers continuing the polemic he initiated acknowledge that cognition's validity and invalidity can be intrinsic (*svatas*) or extrinsic (*paratas*). The issue of the validity and invalidity of cognition has two main aspects: their production and ascertainment. Thus, the following four main questions are discussed: (1) Is validity produced by the same set of factors that produce cognition, or does it require an extraneous factor (often called *guṇa*, 'good quality', 'excellence') for its origination? (2) Does cognition manifest itself as valid, or does it require some extraneous confirmation to manifest its validity? (3) Does invalidity arise from the same set of factors that produce cognition, or does it require some extraneous factor (often called *doṣa*, 'defect', 'bad quality') for its origination? (4) Does cognition manifest itself to us as invalid, or is something extraneous to it needed to reveal its invalidity?

The adherents of the conception called *svataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda* (literally, 'the conception of being a *pramāṇa* of/from itself') answer the first two questions by stating that the set of factors producing cognition also produces its validity and that cognition manifests itself as valid. According to this conception, cognition does not require anything extraneous for its validity, as it is valid 'of/from itself' (*svatas*). The philosophers who give the opposing answer to the first two questions, that is, who hold that an extraneous factor must be added to the set of factors producing cognition to make it valid and that its validity is manifested by some external confirmation, adhere to the conception called *parataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda* (literally, 'the conception of being a *pramāṇa* due to [something] extraneous'). According to this view, cognition acquires validity 'due to [something] extraneous'/'from outside' (*paratas*). The third and fourth questions concern the invalidity (*aprāmāṇya*) of cognition. Like validity, invalidity can be understood as either intrinsic or extrinsic. For example, the Mīmāṃsakas and Advaitins hold that validity is intrinsic and invalidity is extrinsic, and the Naiyāyikas contend that both validity and invalidity are extrinsic.

I shall illustrate the issue of validity and invalidity with the following example. A man travels through a forest and sees a beautiful lake in front of him. If he is an adherent of the view that validity is intrinsic, he will say that the factors that produce his perceptual cognition of the lake (such as the organ of vision, the object of cognition, their contact and the other faculties of his

cognitive apparatus) also produce its validity. He holds that a cognitive process normally, if no distortions in its causes occur, leads to a valid cognition. He will also believe that his perceptual cognition of a lake is valid (until this cognition is overturned by another cognition or until he discovers a defect in its causes) and does not require confirmation by any additional criterion, such as another means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) or practical activity – for example, drinking water from the lake or swimming in it.

If our traveller adheres to the view that validity is extrinsic, he will say that some additional factors, such as the health of his organ of vision, the steadiness of his mind and appropriate distance between his organ of vision and the lake, must be added to the set of factors that produces his perceptual cognition of the lake to make this cognition valid. And the traveller will not accept that his perceptual cognition of the lake is valid until he verifies it by some additional criterion.

If the traveller holds that invalidity is intrinsic, he will say that his perceptual cognition of the lake is probably invalid, for the factors that normally produce cognition do not bring forth its validity. He will also believe that his cognition of the lake is invalid – until he applies an additional criterion to establish its validity.

If the traveller holds that invalidity is extrinsic, he will say that some additional factor, such as damage to his organ of vision, an unsteadiness of his mind or too long a distance between him and the lake, must be added to the set of causes that produces his perceptual cognition of the lake to make this cognition invalid. He will also accept that only some extraneous factor(s) can manifest the invalidity of his cognition of the lake, such as the awareness of a defect in its causes (for example, an eye disease) or the subsequent cognition of a glade overturning the cognition of a lake (which can occur after coming nearer to this place).

I would like to mention, for it is important for the reconstruction of the Sāṃkhya position undertaken in this paper, that extrinsic invalidity seems to be the only position that is logically compatible with intrinsic validity. As to the origination of validity and invalidity, we can assume only one of these two options: (1) the set of factors producing cognition normally generates valid cognition or (2) the set of factors producing cognition normally generates invalid cognition. As to the ascertainment of validity and invalidity, a cognition cannot manifest itself as valid and invalid at the same time.²

² A criticism of the view that both validity and invalidity are intrinsic, which reveals that this view is logically contradictory, is presented, for example, in Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa's *Ślokavārttika*

The important terms of the aforementioned polemic include *svatas*, *paratas*, *prāmāṇya*, *aprāmāṇya*, *pramāṇa*, *pramā* and *jñāna*. In this article, these terms appear both in the Sanskrit original and in the English translation. I translated *svatas* and *paratas*, whose literal meanings are given above, as ‘intrinsic’/‘intrinsically’ and ‘extrinsic’/‘extrinsically’, respectively. I translated *jñāna* as ‘cognition’, *pramā* as ‘valid cognition’, and *pramāṇa* as ‘a means of valid cognition’³ or ‘valid cognition’. In Indian epistemology, *pramāṇa* usually stands for a means of valid cognition, but it can also stand for the result obtained by a means of valid cognition, that is, for *pramā* (MOHANTY 2001a: 28; CHATTERJEE 2003: 41; ARNOLD 2005: 60).

The neutral noun *prāmāṇya* is derived from the word *pramāṇa* and literally means ‘*pramāṇa*-ness’ (‘*pramāṇa*-hood’, ‘*pramāṇ*-ity’). Like *pramāṇa*, the term *prāmāṇya* has two basic meanings in Indian epistemology. The first meaning of *prāmāṇya* is ‘being a means of valid cognition’. Its second meaning is ‘being a valid cognition’; in this meaning, *prāmāṇya* is synonymous with *pramātva* (‘being *pramā*’). In Indian discussions devoted to the issue of *prāmāṇya*, this term is more often used in the second meaning than in the first one.

When *prāmāṇya* is used in the second meaning, it is usually translated by scholars as ‘truth’ (MOHANTY 2001a; UNO 1980; CHAKRABARTI 1984; BILIMORIA 1988: 235–292; CHATTERJEE 1991 and 2003: 41; PERRETT 1998: 25–27) or ‘validity’ (YAMASAKI 1963; SEN GUPTA 1969: 59–73; KUMAR 1983: 177–181 and 1984: 184–194; TABER 1992; KRASSER 2003; ARNOLD 2005: 59–114, 237–256; MCCREA 2015–2018). Chatterjee uses both the English words ‘truth’ and ‘validity’ for *prāmāṇya* (CHATTERJEE 1950: 76–112). Kataoka, too, translates *prāmāṇya* as ‘validity’ (KATAOKA 2002, 2011, 2016) and ‘truth’ (KATAOKA 2011). In the beginning of his chapter ‘Tests of truth and error’, Bhatt notices that it discusses an issue of validity (*prāmāṇya*), which includes in the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā not only truth but also ‘novelty and certitude’ (BHATT 1989: 109); however, he further observes that, in fact, the theorists were preoccupied with the issue of ‘the truth of a cognition’ (1989: 109) and uses the English word ‘truth’ for the Sanskrit *prāmāṇya* throughout his chapter (1989: 109–141).

(II, 35–37). Though I do not see a possibility to agree intrinsic validity with intrinsic invalidity, I am of opinion that the question of whether they are compatible needs further investigation. In the *Tatvasaṃgrahaṇīkā*, Kamalaśīla mentions that in some cases, both validity and invalidity are intrinsic (see ARNOLD 2005: 98).

³ I am aware of the difficulties in finding accurate English equivalents of the Sanskrit terms *jñāna*, *pramā* and *pramāṇa*, as well as of the discussions devoted to this issue. I shall mention only some of many important and insightful publications: BILIMORIA 1985, MOHANTY 2001b, MATILAL 2002, BALCEROWICZ 2009: 139–144, note 4 and GANERI 2018. *Pramā* can also be translated as ‘knowledge’, and *pramāṇa* as ‘a means of knowledge’ or ‘knowledge’.

In this paper, I translate *prāmāṇya* as ‘validity’. I prefer this translation to ‘truth’ for the following reason. *Prāmāṇya* (understood as *pramā*-ness/*pramā*-hood, *pramātvā*) encompasses not only congruity with the object (*yāthārthya*), which can be called truth, but also other characteristics, such as certainty and novelty (different thinkers can add other characteristics to these three or modify their list). *Pramā* is a type of *jñāna*, cognition. It is usually distinguished from other types of *jñāna*, first of all from error, doubt and memory (the terms often used for them are *viparyaya*, *saṃśaya* and *smṛti*, respectively).⁴ The congruity with the object (*yāthārthya*), truth, can also characterise memory, a type of *jñāna* usually considered, along with error and doubt, as *apramā* (cognition that is not *pramā*).⁵ I am by no means claiming that the translation of *prāmāṇya* as ‘validity’, as well as my translations of other Sanskrit terms in this paper, is final. Divergent translations of *prāmāṇya* may follow from the different ways of understanding *prāmāṇya* in the huge number of Sanskrit source texts dealing with this problem.⁶

1.2. The view attributed to Sāṃkhya

In *Ślokavārttika* II, 33, the great Mīmāṃsaka Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa formulates the question of whether the validity (*pramāṇatva*) and invalidity (*apramāṇatva*)⁷ of cognition are intrinsic or extrinsic, which opens the discussion. Next, he identifies and explores the following four positions: (1) Both validity and invalidity are intrinsic. (2) Both validity and invalidity are extrinsic. (3) Invalidity is intrinsic, but validity is extrinsic. (4) Validity is intrinsic, but invalidity is extrinsic, which is the view of Mīmāṃsakas themselves (*Ślokavārttika* II, 34–61).⁸

⁴ On the notion of *pramā* and on distinguishing *pramā* from other kinds of *jñāna*, see, for example, BILIMORIA 1985; MOHANTY 2001a: 60–70, 2001b; KATAOKA 2002 and GANERI 2018. In Sāṃkhya, too, *pramā* is a type of *jñāna* characterised by certainty, lack of error (congruity with the object), and novelty; *pramā* is different from doubt, error, and memory (KUMAR 1984: 21–36; ŁUCYSZYNA 2011).

⁵ The exception is Jaina thinkers treating memory as a type of *pramā*. See BALCEROWICZ 2005.

⁶ MCCREA 2015–2018 shows that Umbeka Bhaṭṭa (ca. 700 CE) and Pārthasārathi Miśra (ca. 1050 CE), two Mīmāṃsā philosophers and commentators of Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa, interpreted *prāmāṇya* as truth. McCrea, however, translates *prāmāṇya* as ‘validity’. I, too, opt for the translation ‘validity’ – to distinguish between *prāmāṇya* (‘validity’) and Sanskrit terms for truth (one of which is *yāthārthya*). The dates of Umbeka and Pārthasārathi are given according to MCCREA 2015–2018: 9.

⁷ In *Ślokavārttika*, Kumāriḷa uses at least three terms for validity (*pramāṇatva*, *prāmāṇya* and *pramāṇatā*) and for invalidity (*apramāṇatva*, *apramāṇya* and *apramāṇatā*).

⁸ See Kataoka’s table enumerating *Ślokavārttika*’s passages devoted to each of the four views (KATAOKA 2011, Part 2: 231, note 164).

The first of the four views identified by Kumāriḷa is that both validity and invalidity are intrinsic (*Ślokavārttika* II, 34–37). In *Ślokavārttika* II, 34ab, he introduces this view:

[Validity and invalidity are] intrinsic because the non-existent cannot be produced. Some claim that both [validity and invalidity] are intrinsic.⁹

Kumāriḷa does not mention whose view it is, but it can be easily associated with Sāṃkhya, for the argument *asatām asādhyatvāt* (‘because the non-existent cannot be produced’) resembles the first Sāṃkhya argument defending its ‘doctrine of the existence of an effect [in its cause]’ (*sat-kārya-vāda*), which reads: *asad-akaranāt* (‘because nothing can bring into existence the non-existent’ / ‘because there is no instrumental cause [that can bring into existence] the non-existent’) (*Sāṃkhyakārikā* 9).

Kumāriḷa’s commentator Sucarita Miśra (10th c. CE)¹⁰ ascribes this view to the *satkāryavādins*, the adherents of the doctrine of the existence of an effect in its cause, by whom the Sāṃkhyas are probably meant, and considers this view as rooted in the *satkāryavāda* (see his *Kāśikā* II, 34–35).

The aforementioned four views have been described also in many other sources, for example, in Kamalaśīla’s (740–795)¹¹ *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s (840–900)¹² *Nyāyamañjarī*. As to the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*, ARNOLD 2005: 97 writes,

[K]amalaśīla’s commentary to the *svataḥ prāmāṇya* chapter of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* lays out the same fourfold scheme – and, while Kamalaśīla here presents the positions without attributing them, he subsequently makes clear that he knows it is the ‘extrinsic validity’ position that is attributed to the Buddhists.

In *Nyāyamañjarī*, too, the conception of intrinsic validity and invalidity is presented without ascribing it to Sāṃkhya or any other *darśana* (Chapter

⁹ *svato ’satām asādhyatvāt kecid āhur dvayaṃ svataḥ* / KATAOKA 2011, Part 2: 233–234 translates: ‘Some say (*kecid āhuḥ*) that both [validity and invalidity] are innate (*dvayaṃ svataḥ*), because things that are of themselves non-existent (*svato ’satām*) cannot be [newly] accomplished (*asādhyatvāt*).’

¹⁰ On the date of Sucarita, David writes, ‘Although Sucarita is often believed to have lived in the 12th century ..., his mention as the “author of the *Kāśikā*” (*kāśikākāra*) by the Buddhist philosophers Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti (both active in the first half of the 11th century) rather suggests an earlier date, perhaps in the 10th century (thanks to Kei Kataoka for this information).’

¹¹ The dates of Kamalaśīla are given according to KATAOKA 2016: 557 (6).

¹² The dates of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa are given according to POTTER 1977: 6, 9.

3, section 3.1–3.4) – see KATAOKA 2016: 557 (6), 550–548 (13–15), 545–524 (18–39).

In the 14th-century Mādhava's *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, 'Compendium of All Darśanas', in the XII chapter devoted to Mīmāṃsā, we encounter the following verse summarising different conceptions of *prāmāṇya* and *apramāṇya*:

The Sāṃkhyas state that validity (*pramāṇatva*) and invalidity (*apramāṇatva*) are intrinsic;

The Naiyāyikas – that they are extrinsic. The Buddhists claim that the latter, [that is, invalidity], is intrinsic,

[And] the first, [that is], validity (*prāmāṇya*), is extrinsic. The adherents of the Vedas

Claim that validity (*pramāṇatva*) is intrinsic and invalidity (*apramāṇatā*) is extrinsic.¹³

The four positions summarised by Mādhava correspond to the four positions that Kumāriḷa presented for the first time. Unlike in the *Ślokavārttika*, in the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, it is said directly that the first view belongs to the Sāṃkhyas, the second to the Naiyāyikas, and the third to the Buddhists. In the *Ślokavārttika*, the fourth position is the position of the Mīmāṃsakas themselves (II, 47–61). Mādhava attributes it to the *vedavādins*, 'the adherents of the Vedas', by whom he means the Mīmāṃsakas and Vedāntins.¹⁴

Later sources, too, attribute to the Sāṃkhyas the view that both validity and invalidity are intrinsic. We encounter this, for example, in the *Mānameyodaya*, a manual of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, composed in the 17th century by Nārāyaṇa Bhāṭṭa and Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita.¹⁵ Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita described the Sāṃkhyas' view on validity and invalidity of cognition as rooted in their *satkāryavāda* (*Mānameyodaya* II, 2, 59). It is worth noting that *Mānameyodaya* is a later text than Aniruddha's *Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti*, which states directly that validity is intrinsic but invalidity is extrinsic (*Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti* V, 51; this passage will be discussed in subsection 2.4 of this article).

¹³ *pramāṇatvāpṛamāṇatve svataḥ sāṃkhyāḥ samāśrītāḥ /
nāiyāyikāḥ te parataḥ saugatāḥ caramaṇ svataḥ //
prathamam parataḥ prāhuḥ prāmāṇyam vedavādinaḥ //
pramāṇatvam svataḥ prāhuḥ parataḥ cāpṛamāṇatām //*

¹⁴ On the Advaitins' accepting this position, see, for example, BILIMORIA 1988: 246–269 and CHATTERJEA 1991; 2003: 24–40.

¹⁵ On the authors and their date, see POTTER 2014: 498–499, 508. The second part of this treatise, which includes the discussion on *prāmāṇya* and *apramāṇya*, was composed by Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita.

Quite often, scholars accept that the view that both validity and invalidity are intrinsic, attributed to the Sāṃkhyas in the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, is really theirs (SEN GUPTA 1969: 60–73; SINGH 1988: 232–234; BHATT 1989: 110–113; WEERASINGHE 1993: 256; GRIMES 1996: 310, the entry ‘Svataḥ-prāmānya-vāda’; SHOKHIN 1997b: 331, note 43). However, some scholars observe rightly that the attribution of this position to the Sāṃkhyas is not supported by extant Sāṃkhya texts (UNO 1980: 542–543; KUMAR 1984: 188; MATILAL 1990: 205; PERRETT 1998: 26; TORELLA 2011: 185).¹⁶ I quote TORELLA 2011: 185:

Of these positions, the least known is the first, according to which what makes cognition true or false are the very conditions under which it is produced; validity and invalidity thus belong to cognition from the start, are evident in themselves and do not need to be ascertained from the outside. Such a position is in line with the philosophic assumptions of Sāṃkhya, but there is no extant Sāṃkhya text that explicitly mentions it.

Scholars often point out that the aforementioned view on validity and invalidity is based on / consistent with Sāṃkhya’s *satkāryavāda* (BHATT 1989: 110–113; SINGH 1988: 232–234; MATILAL 1990: 205; WEERASINGHE 1993: 256).

1.3. The aim of this study and its primary sources

What do extant Sāṃkhya texts say about the validity and invalidity of cognition? What do they say directly and what do they imply? Is the view that both validity and invalidity are intrinsic, presented in the *Ślokavārttika*, *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* and other external sources, really Sāṃkhya’s?

I shall attempt to answer these questions by focusing on extant Sāṃkhya texts from Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s *Sāṃkhyakārikā* to Aniruddha’s *Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti*, that is, on all available Sāṃkhya texts composed before the works of Vijñāna Bhikṣu. I examined all these texts, though only some of them contain evidence on the problem. The sources used in my research belong to three forms of Sāṃkhya: (1) classical Sāṃkhya, presented in Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (SK; ca. 350–450 CE),¹⁷ the first extant Sāṃkhya text, and eight commentaries on it: the commentary that survived in the Chinese translation of Paramārtha¹⁸ (composed ca. 500 CE, translated into Chinese between 557 CE and 569 CE);

¹⁶ These scholars also notice that the conception of validity and invalidity ascribed to the Buddhists, too, is not supported by their texts (UNO 1980: 543; MATILAL 1990: 205–206; PERRETT 1998: 26; TORELLA 2011: 185–186).

¹⁷ The dates and chronological order of Sāṃkhya texts are given according to LARSON 1987: 15–16, 19–22.

¹⁸ I do not know Chinese; I rely on AIYASWAMI SASTRI’S 1944 reconstruction of this commentary in Sanskrit and on Takakusu’s French translation (TAKAKUSU 1904).

the *Sāṃkhyavṛtti* (ca. 6th c. CE); the *Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti* (ca. 6th c. CE); the *Sāṃkhyakārikābhāṣya* (or *Gauḍapādabhāṣya*; ca. 6th c. CE) by Gauḍapāda; the *Yuktiḍīpikā* (YD; ca. 7th c. CE); the *Jayamaṅgalā* (JM; ca. 700 CE or later); the *Māṭharavṛtti* (ca. 800 CE or later) by Māṭhara; and the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* (TK; ca. 841 CE or ca. 976 CE) by Vācaspati Miśra; (2) postclassical *Sāṃkhya* of the *Tattvasamāsa* (ca. 14th c. CE) and its commentary *Kramadīpikā* (ca. 14th c. CE);¹⁹ (3) postclassical *Sāṃkhya* of the *Sāṃkhyasūtras* (SS; ca. 15th c. CE) and their commentary *Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti* (SSV; ca. 15th c. CE) composed by Aniruddha.

All these texts, though belonging to three distinct forms of *Sāṃkhya*, develop the same system of philosophy. The last of them, Aniruddha's SSV, is an original *Sāṃkhya* text accepting and developing the system of thought of classical *Sāṃkhya*. The next commentary on the SS, Vijñāna Bhikṣu's *Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya* (ca. 1550–1600 CE), treats *Sāṃkhya* as part of the Vedānta system of this philosopher. In Vijñāna's commentary, *Sāṃkhya* was absorbed into Vedānta, which to a large extent determined a further image of *Sāṃkhya* in India (see LARSON 1987: 35–41). *Sāṃkhya* texts that have appeared since the time of Vijñāna need to be examined by scholars (see KRISHNA 2006). The questions whether these texts are original (that is, contain important material not found in earlier works) and whether they are *Sāṃkhyan* should be answered.²⁰

¹⁹ At the end of the 19th century, Max Müller argued that the *Tattvasamāsa* was the most ancient of all extant *Sāṃkhya* texts. Müller's dating of the *Tattvasamāsa* has been rejected by the majority of authoritative *Sāṃkhya* researchers (Richard Garbe, Larson, Shokhin, and many others). For summaries of the discussion on the date of the *Tattvasamāsa*, see LARSON 1987: 32–33, LARSON and BHATTACHARYA 1987: 315–319 and SHOKHIN 1997a: 48–65. This discussion was renewed by RUZSA 2013: 101–107, contemporary and renowned *Sāṃkhya* researcher, who held that the *Tattvasamāsa* was 'an ancient text, probably older than Aśvaghoṣa' (2013: 107). Ruzsa's arguments are worth serious consideration. However, in this paper, I accept Larson's dating of the *Tattvasamāsa*. Shokhin, one of the eminent scholars supporting this dating, writes: 'The fact that the first evidence of the *Tattvasamāsa* is the *Kramadīpikā* itself does not allow to date it much earlier than the XIV century' (SHOKHIN 1997a: 56–57). In my opinion, this argument, presented earlier by Larson (LARSON and BHATTACHARYA 1987: 319), is one of the most important arguments for the later dating of the *Tattvasamāsa*. As to the *Kramadīpikā*, the earliest extant commentary of the *Tattvasamāsa*, most scholars agree that it was composed ca. 14th century or later – see LARSON 1987: 33; LARSON and BHATTACHARYA 1987: 319, 321–322 and SHOKHIN 1997a: 65–66. RUZSA 2013: 102, note 19 writes on the date of the *Kramadīpikā*: 'I think that the *Krama-Dīpikā* is not an early text at all (17th century?)'. As neither the *Tattvasamāsa* nor the *Kramadīpikā* contains evidence on the issue of validity and invalidity, we need not dive deep into the problem of the dating of these texts here.

²⁰ The revival of *Sāṃkhya*-Yoga by Hariharānanda Āranya (1869–1947), who is an original thinker, and the community of his followers is worth the special attention. See Jacobsen's and Jakubczak's publications, two of which I mention here: JACOBSEN 2018 and JAKUBCZAK 2020.

1.4. Previous studies and my contribution (novelty of this study)

I encountered three studies devoted to the Sāṃkhya view on validity and invalidity of cognition.²¹ The earliest is Bhatt's (BHATT 1989: 110–113). Bhatt's book, first published in 1962, contains the chapter 'Tests of Truth and Error', describing different conceptions of validity and invalidity. Part of this chapter is devoted to the Sāṃkhya view. Bhatt accepts that the conception of intrinsic validity and invalidity is really Sāṃkhyas' and is based on their *satkāryavāda*. Bhatt's account of this conception and of its criticism relies on its discussion in Mīmāṃsā texts. No Sāṃkhya text is cited in this study.

The next study is Sen Gupta's (SEN GUPTA 1969: 60–73). It forms a part of her book *Classical Sāṃkhya: A Critical Study*. Reconstructing the Sāṃkhya view on the validity and invalidity of cognition, Sen Gupta does not refer to any Sāṃkhya text. She says that available Sāṃkhya texts do not discuss this issue (SEN GUPTA 1969: 65). Sen Gupta holds that according to Sāṃkhya, both validity and invalidity are intrinsic as to their origin: validity is caused by an excess of *guṇa sattva* in the *buddhi*,²² while invalidity is caused by an excess of *guṇa tamas* in it; and the *guṇas* are not additional, external factors but the conditions necessary for the generation of cognition. It is necessary to note that the attempt to explain the origination of validity and invalidity of cognition on the basis of the Sāṃkhya doctrine of the *guṇas* is undertaken in the YD and that the view of the author of the YD differs from the view presented by Sen Gupta as Sāṃkhya's. According to the YD, validity is intrinsic (which agrees with Sen Gupta's conclusion), while invalidity is extrinsic (which is contrary to Sen Gupta's conclusion) – see my analysis of the evidence of the YD in subsection 2.2 of this article.

As to the way validity and invalidity are manifested, Sen Gupta is of the opinion that validity is intrinsic and invalidity extrinsic. She substantiates it as follows: '[T]he natural tendency of man is to accept any and every kind of knowledge as valid as it arises' (SEN GUPTA 1969: 62). Needless to say, what Sen Gupta calls 'the natural tendency of man' is not so obvious for many thinkers, for example, for the Naiyāyikas, who hold that validity is extrinsic both in its origin and ascertainment. Though the scholar believes that according to Sāṃkhya, invalidity is extrinsic as to its ascertainment (for a cognition cannot manifest itself as valid and invalid at the same time), she adds that the opposing view 'can be logically harmonised with the

²¹ Given the enormous number of publications in different languages available today, it is hardly possible to be sure about the current state of research.

²² In Sāṃkhya, *buddhi* ('intellect', 'discernment') is the subtlest and highest product of *prakṛti*. The results of all cognitive and volitional processes are modifications of *buddhi*.

philosophical position of the Sāṃkhya School' (1969: 65). She further attempts to show that some cognitions manifest as valid and some manifest as invalid. It follows then that invalidity can also be intrinsic as to its ascertainment (1969: 68–69). In my opinion, it contradicts Sen Gupta's earlier statement that according to Sāṃkhya, validity is intrinsic in terms of its ascertainment.

Sen Gupta's analysis relies on the Sāṃkhya view regarding the combination of the *guṇas* constituting the cognitive apparatus. She draws the conclusion that according to Sāṃkhya, the validity of cognition, both in terms of its origin and ascertainment, is caused by the predominance of *sattva* in the senses (*indriya*) and in the *buddhi*, while invalidity is caused by the predominance of *tamas*. It is not my task to assess whether the conclusion drawn by Sen Gupta from the Sāṃkhya doctrine of the *guṇas* is right or not (for the critique of this conclusion, see KUMAR 1984: 188–189) – for the reason provided below.

The problem of the validity and invalidity of cognition is not a problem of metaphysical principles, causes or processes that underlie different components of a cognitive situation (such as our cognitive apparatus, the object of cognition, different entities of the world that can influence the cognitive result). The question of validity and invalidity as to their origin is the question of whether cognition (*jñāna*) is usually valid or not, that is, of whether the factors (causes, conditions) that generate *jñāna* (such as contact of a sense with its object) are those that generate *pramā* (valid cognition, knowledge). The question of validity and invalidity as to their ascertainment is the question of whether cognition manifests itself as valid or invalid when it arises.

The matter of whether an effect exists in its material cause, underlying the *satkāryavāda*, from which some philosophers and researchers try to draw the conclusion that, according to Sāṃkhya, both validity and invalidity are intrinsic, too, is hardly relevant to the problem of validity and invalidity. The set of factors producing a cognition, of which the most important is an instrumental cause (*kaṛaṇa*) – the most efficient, necessary and specific cause of a certain type of cognition (for testimonial cognition, for example, a sentence is a *kaṛaṇa*), is irreducible to the material cause. Needless to say, intrinsic validity or intrinsic invalidity could be accepted also by the *darśanas* that did not acknowledge the *satkāryavāda*.

The most recent of these three studies is Kumar's chapter 'Test of validity of knowledge' in his book *Sāṃkhya-Yoga Epistemology* (KUMAR 1984: 184–194). The first half of this chapter is devoted mainly to the analysis of the view of Vācaspati Miśra's TK, the SS, Aniruddha's SSV and Vijñāna Bhikṣu's *Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya* (1984: 185–188). However, Kumar does not attach

direct citations from these texts. While the first half of the study is focused on the Sāṃkhya primary sources, its second part presents Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa's and Sucarita Miśra's discussion of the conception of intrinsic validity and invalidity (1984: 189–193),²³ ascribed to Sāṃkhya.²⁴

What distinguishes my research from previous studies? Two of the three helpful and pioneering studies described above (Bhaṭṭa's and Sen Gupta's) base their conclusions about the Sāṃkhya conception of validity and invalidity on the Sāṃkhya doctrine of the *guṇas*, its *satkāryavāda* or the evidence of the Mīmāṃsā *darśana*, completely ignoring what the Sāṃkhya texts say on this problem. The most recent of these studies – carried out by Kumar and published almost four decades ago – considers what the Sāṃkhya texts say on validity and invalidity, but none of them is directly cited. My research is focused on the evidence found in the Sāṃkhya texts, and it also includes new evidence (not mentioned in the previous publications). In this paper, the Sāṃkhya texts are directly cited and the cited evidence is analysed in detail.²⁵

2. Classical Sāṃkhya

2.1. Sāṃkhyakārikā and its commentaries on the causes of the non-perception of existing objects

Kārikā 7 of the SK is important to identify what conception of validity and invalidity is Sāṃkhya's, though Īśvarakṛṣṇa lived long before Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa, who formulated the issue of validity and invalidity. All classical commentators support what is stated by Īśvarakṛṣṇa in this *kārikā*. The *kārikā* runs as follows:

[The non-perception of an existing object can be caused] by excessive distance, by closeness, by impairment of the sense organ, by unsteadiness of mind,

By subtlety, by an obstruction [between the sense organ and the object to be perceived], by suppression and by intermixture with the similar.²⁶

²³ Kumar presents this discussion also in his earlier book (KUMAR 1983: 177–181).

²⁴ The Sāṃkhya view on validity and invalidity of cognition is discussed also in SREENIVASULU 1991: 17–19, 117–122. Most of the text on pp. 17–19 is copied from BHATT 1989: 110–111, and the text on pp. 119–122 is copied from SEN GUPTA 1969: 60–64. Because of plagiarism, I do not mention Sreenivasulu's publication as a separate study.

²⁵ I would like to note that half of the available classical Sāṃkhya commentaries, namely, the *Sāṃkhyavṛtti*, *Sāṃkhyasaptavṛtti*, JM and *Māṭharavṛtti*, have not been translated into any European language.

²⁶ *atidūrāt sāmīpyād indriyaghātān mano 'navasthānāt / saukṣmyād vyavadhānād abhībhavāt samānābhīhārāc ca //*

From the eighth *kārikā* and the commentaries on the seventh and eighth *kārikās*, we learn that the seventh *kārikā* quoted above lists the causes (*kāraṇa*) of the non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) of some existing objects.²⁷ All available classical Sāṃkhya commentaries, while explaining *kārikā* 7, give examples illustrating these causes.²⁸ Two of these eight causes, namely, ‘impairment of the sense organ’ and ‘unsteadiness of mind’, are the defects of the cognitive apparatus. The other six causes lie in the objective world. One of them, ‘subtlety’ (*saukṣmya*), is the quality of the object that makes perception of this object impossible. The remaining five causes are the conditions of the objective world that hamper perception of the object to be perceived.

In my opinion, *kārikā* 7 and its commentaries show a tendency towards intrinsic validity and extrinsic invalidity of cognition. In a separate *kārikā*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa focuses on the causes that make perception impossible. He says that perception can be blocked by certain defects in its causes, that is, by the cognitive apparatus’ deficiencies, by the location of the object to be perceived beyond the perceptual field of the sense organ, and so forth. These defects seem to be something extraneous to the normal conditions of perceptual cognition. Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa and other philosophers discussing validity and invalidity call such defects of the causes of cognition, preventing arising valid cognition, *doṣas* (*doṣa*, ‘defect’, ‘bad quality’). From all this it follows that in the SK and its commentaries, there is a tendency towards the view that invalidity is extrinsic. Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s and his commentators’ lack of consideration of the ‘excellences’ (being opposite to the defects) of the causes of perception that make it valid (the health of the sense organ, steadiness of mind, apt distance between the sense organ and the object to be perceived, etc.), called *guṇas* (*guṇa*, ‘good quality’, ‘excellence’, ‘virtue’, ‘merit’) in discussions on the validity and invalidity of cognition, may suggest that normal conditions of cognition guarantee its validity. It can be interpreted as a tendency towards intrinsic validity. The aforementioned tendency towards intrinsic validity and extrinsic invalidity relates to the origination of validity and invalidity (not to

²⁷ SHOKHIN 1995: 263, note 1 observes, ‘The following six causes of the non-perception of an object were classified long before the SK, in the famous work *Mahābhāṣya* of the great grammarian Patañjali: excessive remoteness of the object, closeness, “interference” of other objects, lack of lighting (the only point not mentioned by Īśvarakṛṣṇa), weakness of the visual sense organ, distraction of mind (IV.1.3, cf. II.2.5). It does not seem possible to finally answer the question whether Sāṃkhya borrowed this scheme from the Grammarians or Patañjali himself reused the model of preclassical Sāṃkhya. The second of these two hypotheses is, in our opinion, more plausible’.

²⁸ For the examples mentioned in five of them (the commentary that survived in the Chinese translation of Paramārtha, the *Sāṃkhyavṛtti*, the *Sāṃkhyasaptatvṛtti*, the *Gauḍapādashāṣya* and the *Mātharavṛtti*), see SOLOMON 1974: 19–21.

their ascertainment). In Indian *darśanas*, the view on origination of the validity and invalidity is usually the same as the view on their ascertainment.

This tendency is very conspicuous in the JM, which directly calls the defects in the causes of perception *doṣas*. While commenting on the seventh *kārikā*, the JM says the following about the *doṣas*:

[D]ue to the four kinds [of defects], the non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) of even existing things occurs. [It takes place] because of [1] a defect in the location [of the object to be perceived] (*deśa-doṣa*), [2] a defect in the sense organ (*indriya-doṣa*), [3] a defect in the object [to be perceived] (*viśaya-doṣa*) and [4] a defect owing to other things (*arthāntara-doṣa*).²⁹ ...

[The non-perception of an existing object can be caused] ‘by excessive distance’, etc. For example, [there occurs] the non-perception of a bird flying far above.

‘By closeness’ – here, too, the word ‘excessive’ (*ati*) is to be added; ‘by excessive closeness’ – for example, [we do not perceive] the ointment in the eye. And in both [aforementioned] cases, the non-perception is caused by a defect in the location [of the object to be perceived].

‘By impairment of the sense organ (*indriya*)’ – because of a defect of the sense organs (*buddhīndriya*), ear, etc., [there occurs] the non-perception of even [those objects], sounds, etc., [that are] situated in a perceptible (*yogya*) location.

‘By unsteadiness of mind (*manas*)’ – unsteadiness of mind is [its] distraction because of being preoccupied with some other object. And for this reason it does not perceive the proximate object even when the sense organ is unimpaired. And in both [aforementioned] cases, the non-perception is due to a defect in the sense organ. For mind, too, is a sense organ. However, mind is mentioned separately because of its supremacy.

‘By subtlety’ – by the defect in the object [to be perceived]. Thus an object such as an atom³⁰ is not perceived even by [someone with] the steady mind and unimpaired sense organ.

²⁹ Cf. the 17th-century Mīmāṃsā treatise *Mānameyodaya* (II, 2, 75). It mentions the ‘defects in the object’ (*viśaya-doṣa*), which encompass ‘[excessive] remoteness (*dūratva*), etc. (*ādi*)’; ‘defects in the “instrument”’ (*karāṇa-doṣa*), which encompass ‘blindness, etc.’ (*timirādi*); and ‘defects of mind’ (*mano-doṣa*), which encompass its being ‘unsteady, etc.’ (*pāriplavādi*).

³⁰ In the quoted passage of the JM, the word *paramāṇu* is used. It does not follow from this that the JM presents a position that is not Sāṃkhyan. In several other classical Sāṃkhya commentaries, this very word (*paramāṇu*) is used in the same context: *paramāṇu* is an example of an object

‘By an obstruction [between the sense organ and the object to be perceived]’ – when concealed with a curtain, etc., even a big undestroyed jar and other [similar things] are not perceived.

‘By suppression’ – stars are not perceived by day because they are suppressed with the light of the sun.

‘And by intermixture with the similar’ – by the making a heap of similar [things]. For in a heap of grains, one grain flung into [it] is not perceived. In all three [aforementioned cases], the non-perception [occurs] because of a defect owing to other things.³¹

In the JM, the eight defects in the causes of perception listed in the SK are subsumed under the four kinds (*prakāra*) of *doṣas*: (1) the defects in the spatial location of the objects to be perceived, which encompass the first and the second causes of the non-perception mentioned in the SK; (2) the defects of the sense organs, which encompass the third and the fourth causes mentioned in the SK; (3) the defect in the object to be perceived, which is the fifth cause of the non-perception mentioned by Īśvarakṛṣṇa; and (4) the defects appearing because of the intervention of other things, which encompass the sixth, seventh and eighth causes mentioned by Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The JM suggests that as to their origination, invalidity is extrinsic, that is, caused by the *doṣas*, the distorting

that cannot be perceived because of its subtlety – see *Gauḍapādabhāṣya* 7 and 8, *Māṅharavṛtti* 7 and 8, TK 7. In the *Sāṃkhyasaptatvṛtti* (see the commentary on the eighth *kārikā*) and the YD (see its commentary on the seventh *kārikā*: WEZLER and MOTEGI 1998: 98, line 7), the word *truṭi* (which can be, as the word *paramāṇu*, translated as ‘atom’) is used instead of the word *paramāṇu*. In this context, both *paramāṇu* and *truṭi* mean a very small and subtle particle that cannot be perceived by the senses (*indriya*); in the commentaries, particles of mist and smoke are examples of such particles. It is also possible that the Sāṃkhya commentators use the word *paramāṇu* to make their example easily understandable for the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas (atomists).

³¹ ... *caturbhiḥ prakāraiḥ satām api padārthānām anupalabdhir bhavati / deśadoṣād indriyadoṣād viṣayadoṣād arthāntaradoṣāc ca / ... //*
atidūrād ityādi / yathā dūram utpatitasya pakṣiṇo nopalabdhīḥ //
sāmīpyād iti / atisabdo ’rāpi yojanīyah / atisāmīpyād iti / yathā cakṣuḥsthasyāñjanasya / ubhayatrāpi deśadoṣakṛtānupalabdhīḥ //
indriyaghātād iti / śrotārdīnām buddhīndriyāñām doṣād yogyadeśāvasthitānām api śabdārdīnām anupalabdhīḥ //
mano ’navasthānād iti / manaso ’navasthānam asamāhitatā viṣayāntarapravṛttatvāt / tataś cānupahatendriye ’pi sannihitam viṣayam nopalabhate / ubhayatrāpīndriyadoṣād anupalabdhīḥ / manaso ’pīndriyatvād bhednopādānam tu manasaḥ prādhānyārtham //
saukṣmyād iti / viṣayadoṣāt / viṣaya eva paramāṇvādīs tathā yenāvnyagramanasāpy anupahatendriyeṇa nopalabhyate //
vyavahānād iti / yavanikādībhis tirodhānāt sthūlā apy avikṛṣṭā ghaṭādayo nopalabhyante //
abhibhavād iti / ādityaprabhābhībhūtatvād divā tārakā nopalabhyante //
samānābhīhārāc ceti / sadṛśānām rāśikaraṇāt / dhānyarāśau hy eko dhānyaguḍakaḥ prakṣipto na drśyate / triṣv apy arthāntaradoṣād anupalabdhīḥ //

factors extraneous to cognition (which is valid when the *doṣas* do not occur), and validity is intrinsic. The use of the term *doṣa* in this context and the attempt to classify the *doṣas* blocking perception may indicate that the JM, which is probably later than Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika*, refers to the issue of the validity and invalidity of cognition presented by the Mīmāṃsā philosopher.

2.2. Evidence of the *Yuktidīpikā*

Important evidence is contained in the YD, the most detailed and polemic classical Sāṃkhya commentary. The first YD's evidence is related to the origin of the validity and invalidity of cognition, and its second evidence is related to their ascertainment.

2.2.1. Evidence one

The first evidence is part of the polemic on the word *hi* used in the fourth *kārikā* of the SK. The Sāṃkhya proponent argues that *hi* is not redundant. From his reply, I am attaching only the passage relevant to the issue of validity and invalidity:

Because of the possibility of a defect (*vaikalya*) in means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) on account of the dominance of *tamas*, for the mutual relation between *sattva* and the other [two *guṇas*] is not fixed.³² Between these [three *guṇas*], *sattva* and the other [two *guṇas*], the mutual relation is not fixed. Depending on place (*deśa*), time (*kāla*) and [other] efficient causes (*nimitta*), sometimes *sattva* dominates, sometimes *rajas*, [and] sometimes *tamas*. The dominance of *sattva* – because of [its] nature of light – is a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). When *tamas* dominates in that [combination of *guṇas*], then – on account of *sattva*'s being subdued by it – inference (*anumāna*) caused by this is defective (*vikalāṅga*); so even if the inferential sign (*liṅga*) such as the sun is applied correctly for the determining (*niścaya*) of the cardinal directions (*diś*), [inference] is obstructed. But otherwise [inference] does not abandon its nature [of being a *pramāṇa*]. But he who does not acknowledge the hindrance to means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) caused by the defect in [their] origination deals with the *pramāṇas*' abandonment of their nature. How? For such is their nature that they ascertain objects of valid cognition (*prameya*).³³

³² The editors of the YD, Wezler and Motegi, use the boldface type to highlight the *vārttikas*. In the text of the YD, they distinguish two levels – the *vārttika* and the *bhāṣya* – functioning as parts of one whole and probably belonging to the same author.

³³ *sattvādīnām aṅgāṅgibhāv<ā>nyamāt tamaḥprakarṣasāma<rthy>āt pramāṇavaikalypapatteḥ / iha sattvādīnām aniyato 'ṅgāṅgibhāvaḥ / deśakālanimittasāmārthyād dhi kadācit sattvaṃ*

The problem of the validity and invalidity of cognition was not unknown to the author of the YD, though he does not use the terms (*prāmāṇya*, *aprāmāṇya*, *svatas*, *paratas*, *doṣa*, *guṇa*) characteristic of the discussions on this problem. He was either familiar with Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's thought or participated in the pioneering discussion that forewent and stimulated the formulation of the validity and invalidity issue by the Mīmāṃsā philosopher. The second possibility seems more likely to me.³⁴

In the view of the YD's author, validity is intrinsic in its origination and invalidity is extrinsic. He holds that inference and other means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) ascertain objects of valid cognition (*prameya*), that is, have their status of *pramāṇas*, due to their own nature (*svarūpa*), and not due to some extraneous factor(s). It is noteworthy that at the end of this passage, the author mentions three times that the *svarūpa* ('own nature') of means of valid cognition lies in the ascertainment of the objects of valid cognition. This may indicate that he emphasised this idea to oppose the adherents of extrinsic validity, who hold that the validity of perceptual, inferential or testimonial cognition is not due to its own nature but requires some extraneous good quality(ies) (*guṇa*). While validity, according to the YD, is intrinsic as to its origination, invalidity is extrinsic. Cognition becomes invalid because of a defect (*vaikalya*) occurring during its origination. The author of the YD provides the example of the inferential cognition that loses its nature of being valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) because of a defect during its origination.

The author of the YD tries to explain the validity and invalidity of cognition on the basis of the Sāṃkhya doctrine of the *guṇas*. In the *vārttika*, he states that a defect (*vaikalya*) in the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) can occur because of the dominance of *tamas*. From the whole passage (the *vārttika* together with the *bhāṣya*), we learn that the dominance of *sattva* constitutes the 'own nature' (*svarūpa*) of the inferential and other types of cognition and leads to a valid cognitive result, while the dominance of *tamas*, when *sattva* is subdued by it, causes a defective (invalid) cognitive result. This attempt to

prakṛṣyate kadācid rajaḥ kadācit tamaḥ / sattvapraṅkarṣ<aś> ca prakāśarūpatvāt pramāṇam / tatra yadā tamaḥ prakṛṣyate tadā tenābhībhūtātvaṭ sattvasya tatkāryam anumānam <vikalāṅgam> upatiṣṭhata ity atāḥ satyām apy ādityādīliṅgapravṛttau dinnīścyādiṣv artheṣu pratihanyate / itarathā tu na svarūpahanām / yasya tu niṣpattivaikalyāt pramāṇapratibandho neṣṭas tasya svarūpahanām pramāṇānām prāptam / katham / etāvad dhi teṣām svarūpam yad uta prameyaparicchedaḥ / (YD 4; WEZLER and MOTEGI 1998: 68, lines 15–24). The editors used <> to mark their additions and corrections. The YD's explanations of the *kārikās* are often more extensive than the explanations proposed in other commentaries, that is why in the case of the YD, I give, besides the number of the *kārikā*, the pages and lines of the edition.

³⁴ Whether the author of the YD was familiar with texts and views of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa has not yet been determined by scholars and requires further research. On the date of the YD as well as on this matter, see the valuable observations of MEJOR 2004.

explain the validity and invalidity of cognition is confusing, for the question of origin of validity and invalidity is concerned with such factors of cognition as the sense organ, the object of cognition, their contact, the reliable speaker, not with the metaphysical *gunas* underlying cognitive organs and other elements of a cognitive situation (on such attempt undertaken by Sen Gupta, a scholar, see above, subsection 1.4 of this article). However, the author of the YD also mentions important causes that are usually considered during discussions of validity and invalidity. He writes: ‘Depending on place (*deśa*), time (*kāla*) and [other] efficient causes (*nimitta*)’

In this passage, the YD author speaks about *pramāṇas*’ own nature and about a possible defect in their origination on account of which they lose their nature. At first sight, the issue discussed in this passage may seem different from the issue of validity and invalidity of cognition (*jñāna*). In my opinion, however, the difference is apparent. For the YD author, as for Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa and other adherents of the conception of intrinsic validity and extrinsic invalidity, each cognitive process is normally, by its own nature, a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), and its result, a cognition, is a valid cognition (*pramā*, *pramāṇa*); a cognitive process (for example, perceptual, *dr̥ṣṭa*, *pratyakṣa*, or inferential, *anumāna*) can lose its status of *pramāṇa*, which it has by its nature, because of a defect. For these philosophers, *jñāna* is normally identical with *pramāṇa*/*pramā*, and a defect is extrinsic to *jñāna* = *pramāṇa*.³⁵ That is why the YD’s passage on the nature of *pramāṇas* and the loss of their nature on account of a defect can be treated as discussing the validity and invalidity of *jñāna*.³⁶

2.2.2. Evidence two

The second YD’s evidence is contained in the vast polemic on the mutual relation between inference and verbal testimony, in which the Sāṃkhya proponent argues that verbal testimony is a separate *pramāṇa*, irreducible to inference. The evidence runs as follows:

It is not so that a *pramāṇa* requires another *pramāṇa* for establishing its object. If [you] adhere to [the view that] the truth (*yathārthatva*)³⁷ of verbal testimony (*śabda*) requires another *pramāṇa*, [it refers] not

³⁵ This view, shared by the Mīmāṃsakas, Advaitins and Sāṃkhyas, is explained by CHATTERJEA 2003: 29: ‘But the Advaitins hold that *jñāna* and *pramā* are coextensive, the conditions that produce *jñāna* are those that produce truth. They consider *apramā* as an exception, a distortion, so that an analysis of distortion must not influence our analysis of cognition proper.’

³⁶ Cf., for example, *Mānameyodaya*, which at the beginning of the discussion on the validity and invalidity of cognition (*jñāna*) states, using the term *pramāṇa*: ‘[T]he validity of all *pramāṇas* is intrinsic’ (... *svata eva sarvapramāṇānām prāmāṇyam* √) (II, 2, 58).

³⁷ Literally ‘correspondence to the object’, ‘congruity with the object’.

only [to testimony about] heaven and other [imperceptible objects but to all testimony]. What then? [All] words will be invalid (*apramāṇa*). And inasmuch as you admit that inference (*anumāna*), which does not require another *pramāṇa*, establishes [the objects of valid cognition], it well follows that tradition (*āgama*)³⁸ is different from that [i.e. inference].³⁹

In this passage, the Sāṃkhya proponent answers the Buddhist (probably Dignāga). For the opponent, verbal testimony is not a separate *pramāṇa*. He reduces testimony about perceptible objects to inference and rejects testimony about imperceptible objects. In the first part of the quoted passage, the author of the YD reacts to the opponent's view that testimony about imperceptible objects is not a *pramāṇa* because such objects cannot be known through 'another *pramāṇa*', that is, through perception or inference (WEZLER and MOTEGI 1998: 104, lines 5–12). The Sāṃkhya proponent tells the opponent that if we accept that testimony about imperceptible objects requires another *pramāṇa* for establishing its congruity with the object (*yathārthatva*), then testimony about perceptible objects, which the Buddhists reduce to inference, will also require another *pramāṇa* for its verification.⁴⁰ The Sāṃkhya proponent next states that if we acknowledge that testimony needs to be verified by another *pramāṇa*, all testimony will be invalid. He thus suggests that the position that cognition achieved by a *pramāṇa* requires verification by an additional criterion leads to infinite regress: if the first cognition requires verification, then the criterion verifying it will also require verification, and this process of verification will be without an end.⁴¹ In the second part of the quoted passage, the Sāṃkhya

³⁸ The author of the YD uses here two terms for the third Sāṃkhya's *pramāṇa*: *śabda* ('word') and *āgama* ('tradition'). The basic Sāṃkhya terms for this *pramāṇa* are *āpta-vacana* ('authoritative/reliable utterance/statement/sentence') and *āpta-āgama* ('authoritative/reliable tradition') – see SK 4–6.

³⁹ *na ca pramāṇam svārthasiddhaye pramāṇāntaram apeksate / tatra yadi śabdasya pramāṇāntarāpekṣam yathārthatvam āśrīyate tena na kevalam svargādayaḥ / kiṃ tarhi / śabdā evāpramāṇam iti prāptam / anumānasya ca pramāṇāntaranirapekṣasya gamakatvābhyupagamād āgamasya tato 'rthāntaratvam sutarām prasajyate /* (YD 6; WEZLER and MOTEGI 1998: 105, lines 3–7).

^a The edition prepared by Wezler and Motegi has *gamakatvānabhyupagamād*. One of the manuscripts used by the editors has *gamakatvābhyupagamād*, which seems to me a better reading (WEZLER and MOTEGI 1998: 105, note 6).

⁴⁰ Contrary to the Buddhists, Sāṃkhya rejected verbal testimony about perceptible objects and claimed that verbal testimony is applicable only to the imperceptible objects that can be known neither through perception nor through inference (see SK 6 together with the commentaries).

⁴¹ On this infinite regress, see *Ślokovārttika* II, 49–51, 75. Kumāriila argues that extrinsic validity, criticised by him, leads to infinite regress: if a cognition needs to be verified by some subsequent cognition, then the latter one is to be verified by some other cognition, and so forth. This process will never come to an end, and no one will know anything.

proponent says that as the opponent does not suggest that the inference needs to be verified by another *pramāṇa*, his acceptance that verbal testimony requires another *pramāṇa* for its verification reveals the difference between inference and verbal testimony. This means that the opponent questions his own view (that verbal testimony is reducible to inference).

The author of the YD holds that a *pramāṇa* does not require another *pramāṇa* for verifying its result, namely, for establishing its congruity with the object (*yathārthatva*). In my opinion, this indicates that he considers the validity of cognition as intrinsic in terms of its ascertainment. Perceptual, inferential, or testimonial cognition need not be verified by any additional criterion, for the process of such verification will be without an end.⁴² The YD's position is similar to the position of Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa, according to whom all cognitions manifest as valid.

In this passage, the YD's author does not say anything on the invalidity of cognition. The only position on the ascertainment of invalidity that is logically compatible with the aforementioned view on validity seems to be that invalidity is extrinsic. In my opinion, it is very probable that the YD's view on invalidity is similar to the view of Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa: a cognition retains its initial validity until it is overturned by another cognition or until a defect in its causes is discovered.

2.3. Evidence of the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*

In the TK, the last classical Sāṃkhya text, we find the following passage, which is part of Vācaspati Mīśra's commentary on the SK's definition of reliable verbal testimony (*āpta-vacana*):

And that intrinsically valid (*svataḥ-pramāṇa*) [cognition from reliable verbal testimony] is right (*yukta*), for it is free from suspicion (*āśaṅkā*) of any defect (*doṣa*) – because it is produced by sentences of the authorless (*apauruṣeya*) Vedas.⁴³

⁴² The Buddhists, with whom the Sāṃkhya proponent polemicalises, as well as the Naiyāyikas, adhere to the conception of the extrinsic validity of cognition. They hold that the validity of a cognition is ascertained due to the successful activity (*artha-kriyā*) based on this cognition. After cognising that the action based on this cognition is effective, its validity is inferred from this fact. Criticising this view, the Mīmāṃsakas point out that the cognition of the efficacy of the action is itself a cognition that requires verification, and therefore this way of establishing validity does not eliminate the infinite regress. On the Buddhist and Nyāya conceptions of extrinsic validity, see, for example, ARNOLD 2005: 97–103 and CHAKRABARTI 1984.

⁴³ ... *tac ca svataḥpramāṇam apauruṣeyavedavākyajanitatvena sakaladoṣāśaṅkāvinirmuktatvena yuktam bhavati ... /*

The term *svataḥ-pramāṇa* ('being *pramāṇa* from itself') appears in this passage. In classical Sāṃkhya texts, it is the only use of a term with *svatas* or *paratas* related to the problem of validity of cognition. The term *svataḥ-pramāṇa* describes cognition produced by sentences of the Vedas. Vācaspati Miśra presents here one of the main Mīmāṃsā arguments for the unquestionable validity of testimonial cognition caused by sentences of the Vedas: since the Vedas have no author (whose words may be untrue), their sentences can never be defective, and therefore they cannot cause invalid cognition (see *Ślokavārttika* II, 62–70, 95–101, 169–170, 184–186; KATAOKA 2002).

In my opinion, the TK adheres to the view that validity is intrinsic and invalidity is extrinsic – in relation to both their origination and ascertainment. As to the origination of validity, it follows from this passage that cognition from the Vedas sentences is valid due to the lack of defects in its cause, not due to some extraneous factor. As to the origination of invalidity, the passage suggests that it can be caused by some defect (*doṣa*), which means that it is extrinsic. As to the ascertainment of validity, Vācaspati says that there can be no doubt in testimonial cognition caused by sentences of the Vedas, which means that such cognition is manifested as valid and that it will forever be manifested as valid.⁴⁴ As to the ascertainment of invalidity, the passage implies that in the case of the cognition caused by sentences of the Vedas, the initial ascertainment of validity will never be overturned by discovering a defect in its cause, that is, by an extrinsic factor. Though this passage deals with testimonial cognition caused by Vedic sentences, we can say – considering the influence of the Mīmāṃsā thought on it and the Sāṃkhya view on the validity and invalidity of cognition reconstructed from its other texts – that the TK holds the view that any cognition's validity is intrinsic and its invalidity is extrinsic.

3. Postclassical Sāṃkhya of the *Sāṃkhyasūtras* and *Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti*

After Vācaspati Miśra's TK, Sāṃkhya entered a long period of stagnation, from which no text of this *darśana* remained. That period ended with the appearance of two forms of postclassical Sāṃkhya: postclassical Sāṃkhya of the *Tattvasamāsa* and its commentary *Kramadīpikā*; postclassical Sāṃkhya of the SS and their commentary SSV composed by Aniruddha. The *Tattvasamāsa* and *Kramadīpikā* present no evidence on the issue of validity and invalidity. The next – and very important – evidence is contained in the SS and SSV,

⁴⁴ Thus, I do not agree with Kumar's opinion (KUMAR 1984: 187) that of the two aspects of the issue of validity, origination of validity and its ascertainment, the TK touches upon the aspect of its origination only.

whose aim was to revive Sāṃkhya after a long period of stagnation in its development.

The SS devote one of its *sūtras* (V, 51) to the issue of validity and invalidity, and I quote this *sūtra* together with Aniruddha's commentary on it:

THE VALIDITY (*prāmāṇya*) IS INTRINSIC (*svatas*) – BECAUSE OF THE MANIFESTATION OF THE INNER POWER (*nija-śakti*).

From the point of view of origination (*utpatti*), the validity (*prāmāṇya*) rests merely in the set of factors (*sāmagrī*) generating cognition (*jñāna*) – as the inner power (*nija-śakti*), but it does not require [any] additional (*adhika*) good quality (*guṇa*). From the point of view of the cognising (*jñāna*) [of validity], too, the power of revealing validity (*prāmāṇya-bodha-śakti*) to the subjects of cognition (*jñāna-grāhaka*)⁴⁵ is inherent [in the factors generating cognition]. 'The validity (*prāmāṇya*) is intrinsic (*svatas*) – because of the manifestation' of this, [that is, of 'the inner power' (*nija-śakti*)], as well as because of the immediate [human] activity [that follows a cognition]. Even when we use [another] *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇa-anusaraṇa*) to explore the validity [of a cognition]⁴⁶ – in order to remove the doubt, [we do this] for removing the defect (*doṣa*) in the cause (*kāraṇa*), not for [establishing] an [additional] good quality (*guṇa*) [of the cause]. Hence, invalidity is extrinsic (*paratas*) – because in that case the defect, too, is the cause.⁴⁷

SS V, 51 declare that the validity (*prāmāṇya*) is intrinsic (*svatas*). The *sūtra* is situated after a discussion on the authorship of the Vedas, in which the SS defend the position that the Vedas have no author (V, 46–47, 49–50). This gave Vijñāna Bhikṣu grounds to interpret this *sūtra* as stating the intrinsic validity of cognition caused by sentences of the Vedas (see his *Sāṃkhyaprapaścādanabhāṣya* V, 51). However, *sūtra* V, 51 is followed by a discussion on the nature of perceptual error (V, 52–56), which gives grounds to interpret it in the general epistemological context, that is, as stating the intrinsic validity of every cognition. Aniruddha understands that this *sūtra* states the intrinsic validity

⁴⁵ *Jñāna-grāhaka*, translated by me as 'subject of cognition', can be translated also as '[cognition] grasping the cognition'. See CHATTERJEA 2003: 41–63.

⁴⁶ This part of the sentence can also be translated as: 'Even when we follow the *pramāṇa* to explore [its] validity'

⁴⁷ *NĪJAŚAKTYABHIVYAKTEḤ SVATAḤ PRĀMĀṆYAM //*

nijaśaktijñānanakanasāmagrīmātrādīnam prāmāṇyam na tv adhiḥkaṃ guṇam apekṣate utpattipakṣe / jñānapakṣe 'py autsargikī jñānagrāhakaṇām prāmāṇyabodhaśaktiḥ / tadabhivyakteḥ svataḥ prāmāṇyam jhaṭiti pravṛtteś ca / yatrāpi śaṅkānivṛttaye prāmāṇyajijñāsārtham pramāṇānusaraṇam tatrāpi kāraṇadoṣotsaraṇāya na guṇāya / ata evāprāmāṇyam parataḥ tatra doṣasyāpi kāraṇatvād iti //

of cognition in general. Even if the intention of the author of the SS was to claim the intrinsic validity of cognition caused by sentences of the Vedas, we can accept that he acknowledged intrinsic validity of every cognition. We can accept this on the basis of the view of classical Sāṃkhya, whose teaching was defended by the author of the SS, as well as on the basis of the fact that usually the view on the validity of a certain type of cognition acknowledged by an Indian *darśana* did not differ from its view on validity of other types of cognition.

The *sūtra* states that the validity is intrinsic ‘because of the manifestation of the inner power’ (*nija-śakti-abhivyaakteḥ*).⁴⁸ The *sūtra* means that the validity is the inner power (*śakti*) located in the factors producing cognition, and generating cognition is the process of manifesting this inner power; this *śakti* becomes manifest when we achieve the cognitive result (as the property of this result). The quoted *sūtra* can be interpreted in terms of both origination and ascertainment of validity. From the point of view of the origination of validity, the *sūtra* can be interpreted as saying that the set of factors producing cognition has an inner power of producing it as a valid cognitive result and that no external factor (called *guṇa*, ‘good quality’, in the discussions on validity and Aniruddha’s commentary) is needed to make this result valid. From the point of view of the ascertainment of validity, the *sūtra* can be interpreted as saying that the set of factors producing cognition has an inner power of revealing its validity.

It is very probable that the *sūtra* encompasses both aforementioned aspects of validity, namely, its origination and ascertainment; and Aniruddha understands it in this way. The author of the SS could well compose this *sūtra* with the double meaning – to convey maximum sense in minimum words. The intention to express both aspects of validity by the same combination of words can also be explained by the certain unity of these two aspects of validity. On this unity, I cite Taber: ‘But then, since the capacity to determine its object entails an awareness of its truth, every cognition must involve an awareness of its own truth’ (TABER 1992: 211). The inner power/capacity (*śakti*) of the factors generating cognition to produce valid cognition is also the power to bring forth the ascertainment of validity of the cognitive result.

It is clear that the *śakti* mentioned in the quoted *sūtra* and its commentary is not the *śakti* of the Sāṃkhyas, understood as the state of the latent (potential) existence of an entity in its material cause.⁴⁹ This *śakti* is the *śakti* of the Mīmāṃsakas. I opt to translate the term *śakti* characteristic of the Sāṃkhyas

⁴⁸ Cf. *Ślokavārttika* II, 47–48.

⁴⁹ On the Sāṃkhya notion of *śakti*, see RATIÉ 2014: 136, note 38; 144, note 66.

as ‘potency’ and the term *śakti* characteristic of the Mīmāṃsakas as ‘power’, ‘capacity’, ‘faculty’, ‘function’, or ‘functionality’. To illustrate the notion of *śakti* of the Mīmāṃsakas: fire has the capacity (*śakti*) of burning, and the set of causes of cognition (*jñāna*) has the *śakti* of producing a valid cognitive result.⁵⁰ The Naiyāyikas rejected the Mīmāṃsakas’ notion of *śakti*, holding that cognition is produced by its set of causes, and there is no reason to accept the *śakti* located in the set of causes – see, for example, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s *Nyāyamañjarī*, Chapter 1 (VARADACHARYA 1969: 108–114).

As I mentioned above, Aniruddha interprets this *sūtra* as encompassing two aspects of validity, that is, its origination and ascertainment. He states directly that the validity is intrinsic in terms of both origination and ascertainment and explains both these aspects. I described these aspects above while interpreting the *sūtra*. As to the second aspect, that is, ascertainment of validity, Aniruddha, alongside substantiating it being intrinsic by the intrinsic character of every *śakti* (*Ślokavārttika* II, 47–48 presents this argument), which is the argument implied by the *sūtra*, gives one more argument. He substantiates it being intrinsic by the immediate human activity that follows a cognition. This argument, too, is the Mīmāṃsakas’ (see ARNOLD 2005: 88; 246, note 83).

While the *sūtra* speaks only of the validity, Aniruddha also presents the view on invalidity. He says that the invalidity is extrinsic (*paratas*). Kumar rightly observes that Aniruddha’s direct claim that invalidity is extrinsic pertains to the origination of invalidity and that invalidity being extrinsic in terms of the ascertainment is implied by his commentary (KUMAR 1984: 187–188). As to the origination of invalidity, it arises on account of a defect (*doṣa*) in the causes (*kāraṇa*) of cognition. Aniruddha says that in the case of an invalid cognition, the defect, too, is the cause, that is, some extraneous cause added to the set of causes of normal cognition. As to the ascertainment of invalidity, the SSV suggests that, normally, cognition presents itself as valid (brings certitude of its validity, not doubt), and its validity should not be tested unless there is evidence of a defect (*doṣa*) in its causes; the detection of a defect in the causes of cognition removes this intrinsic certitude and becomes the factor causing invalidity. Thus, the invalidity is extrinsic as to its ascertainment, for it is ascertained due to the awareness of a defect in the causes of cognition, which is something extraneous to its normal causes. The awareness of a defect in the causes of cognition is one of the two extraneous causes of the ascertainment of invalidity accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas. The second extraneous cause of the ascertainment of invalidity acknowledged by the Mīmāṃsakas is the cognition overturning the initial cognition.

⁵⁰ On *śakti* in Mīmāṃsā, see TABER 1992: 210–211 and KATAOKA 2002: 1026–1025 (11–12).

The position presented in the SS and SSV, though it involves the Mīmāṃsā notion of *śakti* and Mīmāṃsā arguments, is Sāṃkhyan, which means that it agrees with the view of classical Sāṃkhya texts. The author of the SS and Aniruddha aimed to revive and defended the system of thought of classical Sāṃkhya. Though they used the ideas of another *darśana*, the view on validity and invalidity they formulated was Sāṃkhyan. As to the Aniruddha's commentary, it was the first Sāṃkhya text that directly stated the Sāṃkhya position on both validity and invalidity of cognition and that used all main terms characteristic of discussions on this issue (*prāmāṇya*, *aprāmāṇya*, *svatas*, *paratas*, *doṣa*, *guṇa*).

4. Conclusion

Having reconstructed the Sāṃkhya view on the validity and invalidity of cognition on the basis of classical and postclassical Sāṃkhya texts, namely, all extant Sāṃkhya texts from Īśvarakṛṣṇa's SK (ca. 350–450) to Aniruddha's SSV (ca. 15th c.), I conclude that this view differs from the view attributed to Sāṃkhya by external sources and many researchers. External evidence, such as Sucarita Miśra's *Kāśikā*, Mādhava's *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, and *Mānameyodaya*, ascribes to Sāṃkhya the view that both validity and invalidity are intrinsic. My analysis shows that according to Sāṃkhya, validity is intrinsic but invalidity is extrinsic. This conclusion pertains to both aspects of validity and invalidity – origination and ascertainment.

The tendency towards intrinsic validity and extrinsic invalidity in the aspect of their origination can be traced already in the SK. Īśvarakṛṣṇa lists, in *kārikā* 7, the causes of non-perception – that is, the defects in the causes of perceptual cognition that make valid perceptual cognition impossible. These defects are extraneous to the normal conditions of perceptual cognition. This tendency is supported by all classical Sāṃkhya commentaries on *kārikā* 7. It is especially conspicuous in the JM, which classifies these defects and applies to them the term *doṣa* ('defect', 'bad quality'), used by Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa and other philosophers in their discussions on validity and invalidity.

The YD provides important evidence, though the commentary does not use terminology characteristic of the discussions on this issue (that is, such terms as *prāmāṇya*, *aprāmāṇya*, *svatas*, *paratas*, *doṣa*, *guṇa*). According to the YD's commentary on the fourth and sixth *kārikās*, validity is intrinsic and invalidity is extrinsic, both in their origination and ascertainment. Vācaspati Miśra's TK (the last classical Sāṃkhya text) – which describes, in its commentary on the sixth *kārikā*, testimonial cognition caused by sentences of the Vedas as *svataḥ-pramāṇa* ('being *pramāṇa* from itself') – too, adheres to the view that

validity is intrinsic and invalidity is extrinsic both in their origination and in their ascertainment.

The postclassical SS state that validity (*prāmāṇya*) is intrinsic (*svatas*) (V, 51). This statement probably encompasses both origination and ascertainment of validity. Aniruddha's SSV, the earliest and most important commentary on the SS, argues that validity is intrinsic and invalidity is extrinsic. Aniruddha's position on validity and invalidity pertains to both their origination and ascertainment. He uses all main terms characteristic of the discussions on this problem (*prāmāṇya*, *aprāmāṇya*, *svatas*, *paratas*, *doṣa*, *guṇa*).

Considering the Sāṃkhya view reconstructed from classical and postclassical Sāṃkhya texts, it is hardly possible to agree with Kumar's opinion (KUMAR 1984: 194):

We have no conclusive evidence to reject or to support either of the above views put forward by Kumārilabhaṭṭa and Mādhavācārya on the one hand, and by Aniruddha on the other, as really held by the Sāṃkhyas. Hence we arrive at two possibilities: (1) the early Sāṃkhyas held the theory of intrinsic validity and invalidity of knowledge and it was revised later on at the hands of Aniruddha and (2) Kumārilabhaṭṭa and others on the one hand and Aniruddha on the other might have recorded the theory from different sources which are not available to us.

My analysis of Sāṃkhya texts shows that *there is* convincing evidence to reject that the view that both validity and invalidity are intrinsic, attributed to the Sāṃkhyas, is Sāṃkhyan, and to accept that the view that validity is intrinsic and invalidity is extrinsic, defended by Aniruddha in the SSV, is held by the Sāṃkhyas. For the time being, no Sāṃkhya text that supports the opinion that Sāṃkhyas acknowledged intrinsic invalidity is discovered (though we cannot rule out the possibility that such text will be discovered in the future). Available Sāṃkhya sources contradict this opinion.

I am inclined to agree with Kataoka, who says that the view that both validity and invalidity are intrinsic, presented and criticised by Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa and attributed by his later followers to the Sāṃkhyas, probably arose as part of the hypothetical classification and was not the view of any real Kumāriḷa's opponents. I cite Kataoka's comment (KATAOKA 2011, Part 2: 233, note 169) on the view that both validity and invalidity are intrinsic presented in the *Ślokavārttika*:

Kumāriḷa's classification is quite mechanical and looks highly hypothetical. It is unlikely that Kumāriḷa has a particular opponent in mind, although it is true that the pattern of thinking in this view accords well with that of the Sāṃkhya.

In my opinion, it is very probable that the view that both validity and invalidity are intrinsic was attributed to the Sāṃkhyas because of the association of this view, presented by Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa, with Sāṃkhya's *satkāryavāda*. It is obvious that a conception of validity and invalidity cannot be based on the *satkāryavāda* because the factors producing cognition cannot be reduced to the material cause. However, such association was not completely ungrounded because Sāṃkhya tried to reduce all types of causes to the material cause (see SK 15–16, 27, 57 with the commentaries), though it could not consequently reject all other types of causality. In any case, it clearly follows from Sāṃkhya texts that Sāṃkhya did not accept intrinsic invalidity. Intrinsic invalidity seems to be incompatible or difficult to agree with intrinsic validity. The view that both validity and invalidity are intrinsic probably arose as part of the classification of the views presented by Kumāriḷa, described by Kataoka as 'quite mechanical' and 'highly hypothetical'. It should not be believed that the view that both validity and invalidity are intrinsic, attributed to the Sāṃkhyas, had real adherents among them – as long as Sāṃkhya texts or passages from them that confirm this attribution are not discovered.

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Contents

- **MALGORZATA WIELIŃSKA-SOLTWEDEL:** Editorial 5
- **DIWAKAR ACHARYA:** The Androgynous Form of Viṣṇu and the Yet
Unpublished *Vāsudevakalpa* 7
- **HERMINA CIELAS:** Elements of Animate and Inanimate Nature
in the Practice of *Avadhāna* 29
- **MAX DEEG:** Indian Regional *nāga* Cults and Individual *nāga*
Stories in Chinese Buddhist Travelogues 51
- **NICOLAS LEVI, ROMAN HUSARSKI:** Buddha under Control.
Buddhism's Legacy in North Korea 79
- **HONG LUO:** The Karmabhedavastu of Guṇaprabha's *Vinayasūtra* 97
- **OLENA ŁUCYSZYNA:** Sāṃkhya on the Validity (*prāmāṇya*)
and Invalidity (*aprāmāṇya*) of Cognition 145
- **KATARZYNA MARCINIAK:** The Thirty-Two Marks of a Great Man
in Two Metrical Lists in the *Mahāvastu* 177
- **XIAOQIANG MENG:** A Preliminary Study of the Dunhuang Tibetan
Fragments of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-Ekottarakarmaśataka* (I):
Tarjanīyakarman 205
- **MARTA MONKIEWICZ:** Calendrical Terminology in the Early
Vedic Astronomical Treatises of the *Jyotiṣavedāṅga* 243

- **TAO PAN:** Tocharian A *ārkiśoṣi* ‘world with radiance’
and Chinese *suo po shi jie* ‘world of *sabhā*’ 263
- **DAVID PIERDOMINICI LEÃO:** A New House for the God in Tenkasi:
Divine Dreams and Kings in 15th–16th-century Pāṇṭiya
Inscriptions and Sanskrit Courtly Production 295
- **BARBARA STÖCKER-PARNIAN:** The Tomb Inscription for Liu Zhi
at the End of the Qing Period (1910). Commemoration
of an Islamic Scholar by a Traditional Inscription to Support
Modernisation 313
- **HANNA URBAŃSKA:** The Twilight Language of Siddhas
and Sanskrit Figures of Speech in *Viśākha Ṣaṣṭi* 329
- **AIQING WANG:** *Breaking an Eagle* and Pick-Up Artists in
a Chinese Context 357
- Editorial principles 376